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Gretchen Edelmen
Abstract
The attitudinal model of the Supreme Court is now a well accepted
and valid way to explain the voting behavior of justices, as judicial prefer-
ences dictate the eventual voting that occurs in cases. While many studies
have looked at overall judicial ideologies through a variety of di↵erent mea-
sures, this paper is the first that looks at judicial ideology and determines
preferences within a single doctrine through a question level analysis us-
ing ideal point estimation. To explore this measure of ideology inside a
single-issue area I use the Miranda doctrine and its progeny cases to score
judicial votes on each question that the court addressed regarding Miranda.
A long with determining these ideological scores and accompanying analy-
sis, this thesis contains a complete history of the progeny cases. The results
here indicate that judicial preferences can be scored within an issue area or
single-doctrine as well as across issue areas as in the past, and opens up fur-
ther avenues of research in separate issue areas a long with the revelations
made about Miranda and the court already presented.
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1 Introduction
The judicial system, and particularly the United States Supreme Court, has
recently become a hot-button issue in national politics, evidenced by not just
academia’s interest in the subject, but mainstream media making it a talking point
as well. These claims are evidenced by the 900-plus results on Google Scholar that
have been published in the last twelve months, and the recent new articles on the
nomination of Judge Gorsuch, or how Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell
made nominations an issue in American politics. While the Supreme Court is
currently a very salient issue, the study of the issues surrounding the Court is
very recent especially compared to other areas in political science. The earliest
published papers and studies regarding the court began to appear in the late 1800’s
and early 1900’s, more than one hundred years after the creation of the court.
While many of these early studies focused on the scope of the Supreme Court and
its constitutional ability to make and shape decisions, the area of interest that I
am studying is in regards to individual justices’ decision making on issue-areas -
how justices vote.
Judicial voting patterns are an important area of study as how it can reveal
how justices decide a case - strategically, sincerely, or a number of other ways. The
interest in this issue area is due to a number of factors but particularly because
justices are appointed for life and are therefore insulated from many political
pressures. Additionally their political preferences, or preferences otherwise lack
transparency when they decide a case, as our only record of how the decide is in
the opinions authored by one but signed by many, and the steps taken to get their
are very opaque. Scholars have looked at voting patterns in a number ways with
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a number of di↵erent theories and ways to score these votes, almost all focusing
on the way cases are decided. However, this approach is problematic because the
court does not vote on cases, rather the justices answer specific constitutional
questions that are posed by the court. My work on this thesis addresses justice-
voting on a question basis rather than on a case-by-case basis, as well as assigning a
case weight for each case and how much influence it has on an eventual ideological
score given to a justice.
My thesis scores each question answered by the court on a justice-by-justice
basis as either conservative or liberal. These scores, 0 for liberal and 1 for con-
servative are done in regards to a precedent case and each progeny case is broken
down to the question-level and then scored. While many cases only answer one
constitutional question in regards to the progeny, some answer more than one
resulting in multiple scores for a single case. I chose to examine how the Fifth
Amendment moves over time in this conservative-liberal voting framework with
Miranda v. Arizona as my precedent case and the subsequent cases representing a
progeny where one or more question relating to the doctrine had been addressed.
The coding and identification of the cases was only one part of the research though,
as the justice’s voting patterns were then examined and compared to other liter-
ature as well as assessed on their own as the question-level analysis is unique to
this paper.
The thesis continues after this introduction with a literature review, discussing
relevant works regarding judicial voting and some of the problems associated with
pasts approach by other scholars. In particular, the Segal-Cover Voting Scores
and the Rice, et al. scores while be discussed and the di↵erences in my approach
with the approach of those two works being contrasted with the approach I take.
Following the literature review is a methods and data section where the coding
procedure is discussed, data manipulation is discussed and presented as well as
any relevant insight that was gleaned is presented. For transparency, as well as
a qualitative look at the conservative-liberal movement of the cases, a chapter is
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dedicated to the discussion of each and every case where the facts and questions
the court addressed are discussed, as well as how and why each case was coded
is addressed. Finally, the paper concludes with a summary of the work presented
here, how this contextualizes in the greater literature on judicial voting, and fur-
ther avenues of research as this paper is limited in its scope to voting on the
Miranda doctrine.
2 Literature Review
The study of the Supreme Court voting patterns presented here rely on jus-
tice’s addressing individual constitutional questions in through the decisions they
make, and then aggregating these preferences to identify a pattern and create a
predictive model. Furthermore, the assumption here is that the attitudinal model
is the correct way model of judicial preferences, and support for this assumption is
provided from a plethora of literature. The approach explained above to explain
Supreme Court behavior has been used by many scholars to create an expansive
body of literature on how and why the court and its justices decide and vote on
cases. The earliest work on the court’s behavior occurred in The Roosevelt Court
by C. Herman Pritchett, and while this work does not provide a theory of judicial
decision making, it did examine non-unanimous decision making as well as laid
the foundation for the field.
Although a relatively new area of study for political science, with Pritchett’s
book published in 1947, many scholars since then have tried to explain how the
Supreme Court make decisions and the ideology of justices and the court, and
many studies subsequently attempted to score and predict judicial behavior. The
approach taken here centers around the attitudinal model, as well as the court’s
ability to make policy with its rulings. The court is able to ignore the preferences
of all other actors - the President, Congress, the mass public, and special interests
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- because the Court is insulated from other pressures (Segal and Spaeth, 1993).
The second claim, the court’s ability to make policy, is clearly demonstrated in
Miranda and its progenies; whenMiranda v. Arizona was decided, the case created
sweeping policy change across the United States. The decision brought with it a
statement of rights that subsequently had to be read to every person under arrest
in every jurisdiction across the country. Although the policy was first created with
Miranda, as we will see this is far from the last prescription the court would write
regarding this doctrine.
A similar approach is also taken by Segal and Spaeth in ”The Supreme Court
and the Attitudinal Model Revisited” in which their favored model, as well as mine,
is the attitudinal model where decisions are be made along ideological (attitudinal)
preferences in terms of liberal or conservative political doctrine. In this work they
describe an attitude as “interrelated set of beliefs about an object or situation”
and that justices are outcome oriented (Spaeth and Segal, 2002). While defining
the attitudinal model, their work also supports it as the Segal and Spaeth (2002)
find that in many issue areas a justices ideological preferences are statistically
significant in how they will decide any given case. Even in work that was designed
to refute the attitudinal model, support for model as ideological preferences have
a significant impact on judicial decisions (Begara et al. 2003). This approach
has not been universally accepted however, with many scholars applying di↵erent
models to the court. Segal and Spaeth (2002) themselves take time to discuss a
rational choice model, the legal model along with strategic voting as a common
explanation for the Supreme Court’s behavior.
One work that makes alternative claims of judicial behavior is ”Supreme Court
Justices as Strategic Decision Makers: Aggressive Grants and Defensive Denials
on the Vinson Court” by Boucher and Segal (1995) make claims that the court is
constrained by Congress while acknowledging that the ideological preferences of
the court do in fact play an important role. With that being said their own work
shows that the Court often challenges Congress, and acts completely unconstrained
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for most periods during the analysis with the exceptions of what they identify as
“shifts” in the Supreme Court. Notably, they contend that the court now acts
unconstrained, reinforcing the choice of the attitudinal model for forward looking
analysis, at least in the near future as a paradigm shift is almost impossible to
predict ahead of time. Another often explored approach to voting patterns has
been strategic voting, in which justices employ sophisticated voting behavior to
shape their decisions. One approach developed in Sophisticated Voting and Gate-
Keeping in the Supreme Court a measure of justices’ preferences for outcomes
on the merits of a given case based on their votes on the merits on similar, but
di↵erent cases from the past. This examination of similar merits to predict similar
cases in the future is analogous to my approach of examining how justices answer
questions of case in a single issue area to then predict outcomes on similar questions
and issue areas. While the approach is similar, the theoretical basis, as mentioned
earlier, is di↵erent from mine.
Ultimately, the authors in ”Sophisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping in the
Supreme Court” examine an outcome in conjunction with a grant of certiorari
at the case-level unit of analysis. However, Calderia, Wright and Zorn (1999) only
go as far to say that sophisticated voting occurs during agenda setting, and fail to
make sweeping claims about voting on case outcomes once they occur. Although
claims are made that because sophisticated voting may occur at a point in the
process they occur throughout the process and most importantly when justices
decide a case (Calderia et al. 1999). The evidence for this broad of a claim cannot
be borne out simply through cert voting especially given that a majority of votes
is not needed for the court to hear a case. Other research has examined how
the grant of cert to glean information about judicial behavior as well. In fact,
some scholars have failed to find a Unlike the work by Calderia, Wright, and Zorn
other scholars have shown that justice’s acting on their preferences do so not only
when rendering a decision but also when deciding to hear a case (Brenner, 1979).
Although these cert votes are also conditioned on the fact that justice’s need
7
complete information to determine if granting a cert will result in their preferred
outcome, it only requires that justices believe they have complete information to
shape their voting preferences. That is if a justice wishes to a rm, he will vote to
grant cert when he thinks that at least five other justices will also vote to a rm
the lower court decision.
The use of cert to reveal preferences is also reflected in the cue theory. The
cue theory was developed as a result of such studies by Joseph Tanehaus, and
while the basis of the theory stands up, which is that certain characteristics of the
case cause it to be issued a grant certiorari, it has been adapted and sharpened to
more precisely define the cues. This is done with the use of hindsight as the issues
that are important to the court and for at the time the case was heard allow for
an observer to more accurately determine what a cue was at that point. In this
sense the theory is not so much predictive in determining what cases are heard,
but rather reactive and in need of constant revision, as cue theory essentially says
“justices will hear cases they think are important (Teger and Kosinski, 1980).”
The revision of the cue theory does allow for one to see what issues were
important to the court at a given time through systematically evaluating a given
cue, but does not provide a predictive measure. While similarly in my model I
look backwards to determine what the court did do through the testing of a single
issue area before looking to see how the court behaviors in the future. Similarly
to cue theory, the main goal of the models developed in this paper is to explain
behavior that has happened, and then assign a normalized quantitative scale to
explain judicial behavior. Unlike the cue theory however, the models developed
here could be applied to predict judicial votes especially in the same issue area
assuming that there is enough data points for a given area and given justice.
Although this to has limitations as a justice who has heard few cases, and none
on an issue area studied, would make it di cult or impossible to determine future
voting.
As pointed out by McGuire, et al. “the ideological direction of the Court’s
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judgment and not the content of the underlying rule may, but need not coin-
cide,” which they contend systematically biases studies that code outcomes. This
systemic bias is a problem which I also try to address by coding answers to ques-
tions rather than outcomes of cases. The study, Measuring Policy Content on the
Supreme Court, also examines judicial behavior through the grant of certiorari
and whether the court a rms or reverses a lower court decision. They find that
a court’s decision to a rm run counter to the court’s ideological preferences and
votes to reverse match the court’s ideological preferences, when applied to individ-
ual justices this pattern holds but changes direction as justices move further from
the court’s ideological center. Ultimately, the authors recommend that “for the
ideological position of an opinion should rely upon decisions (or votes) to reverse
as the appropriate set of decisions (or votes) from which to generalize.”
However, this work has been contested by Caldeira and Wright (1990) which
contests that these findings by McGuire et al. (2009) are a result of their focus
on the modern court rather than including paradigm shifts in the court’s history
(Calderia and Wright, 1990). The historical review of the entire court’s history
is something I try to mirror by reviewing an entire issue area’s movement over
time. Ultimately, Rice et. al’s (2016) work finds that “a series of major changes
in the Court’s history precipitated shifts in the Court’s agenda, but only when the
Court was given nearly complete control over its agenda and expansive jurisdic-
tion did the Court began to systematically vote,” and this systemic voting is the
cornerstone to my research as well as many others. Their work leaves the open the
individual analysis of the court’s justices, an avenue of research that is addressed
here, although has been addressed by many other scholars as well and their work
is also discussed below. Additionally Rice, et al. (2016) develop their own set of
scores across doctrine’s, that unlike the other scores and similar to mine are un-
constrained in nature. However, unlike the scores for ideological issues developed
here, they work across issue areas to determine a justice’s overall ideology rather
than an ideology related to one doctrine.
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The Segal-Cover scores developed in the paper ”Ideological Values and the
Votes Court U.S. Supreme Court Justices” which examine newspaper editorials
prior to confirmation. These scores also heavily rely on the work by Segal and
Spaeth (2002) mentioned earlier as they are based on the attitudinal model, mea-
suring the ideological preferences therefore implicitly implying acceptance of the
attitudinal model as their preferred model of the court (Segal and Spaeth, 2002).
The scores they then developed on information prior to confirmation are strongly
correlated to the votes the justices then made on actual cases, making their model
a valid predictor of the Supreme Court. Segal and Cover (1989) also argue that
their work shows that justices are not bound by legal doctrine and justices are
free to use whatever doctrine they choose in making decisions. The lack of judicial
restraint in regards to stare decisis and attitudinal voting also plays an important
role in once again reinforcing the attitudinal model of the court, which is a key
assumption that I build o↵ of when coding decisions as liberal or conservative. If
justices were deciding the case based on some objective set of criteria my work
here, and many others would be a moot point. This work was important for mine
additionally as it helped explain di↵erences in decisions between justices at the
case level, which provides a similar frame of reference to my model which explains
di↵erences at the question level.
Although not explicitly compared to the model I develop in this paper, Martin-
Quinn scores developed in ”Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain
Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court 1953-1999” by Andrew D. Martin and
Kevin M. Quinn, also warrant discussion. The Martin-Quinn are unique most
notably because they show how Justice’s preferences change over time. The scores
change because they are derived from dynamic item response and a Bayesian
approach which instead look at votes as a function of policy preferences; first by
developing a theoretical model of decision making and then operationalizing that
it into a statistical model. This is juxtaposed with the Segal-Cover Scores which
are static, as mine are, and are not designed, nor do they show movement of
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justice’s preferences over time. The scores developed by Martin and Quinn are
also based on the attitudinal model and that justices vote their true preferences
when voting on the merits. The attitudinal model is also coded into my work along
liberal-conservative answers to a give question in a case, this is especially for non-
unanimous cases as a way to reconcile how justices reach separate conclusions
given the same facts.
3 Doctrinal History and the Cases
In order to properly code each justice’s’ question decision as either liberal
or conservative a thorough understanding of the fifth amendment, the precedent
case, and its progeny is absolutely necessary. The relevant case history begins
with Miranda v. Arizona, and is the precedent case that each subsequent case
involving a suspect’s right to be informed of the Constitutional guarantees under
the then established Miranda rights and strengthened the previously incorporated
Fifth Amendment. Following a discussion and dissection of Miranda in order will
be a discussion of the facts of each relevant progeny cases, with the facts of each
case summarized, as well as how the justice’s addressed the relevant Fifth Amend-
ment and Miranda questions that compose the cases. A discussion of the cases
and subsequent coding of how the questions were answered also adds important
transparency to the research, in an e↵ort show that the coding decisions that were
made were not arbitrary but rather fit with a traditional understanding of liberal
or conservative doctrine.
The fifth amendment protects against self-incrimination among other rights
such as double jeopardy, due process, and the right to a grand jury. Protec-
tion against self-incrimination was originally recognized as compelled testimony
that would incriminate yourself during a criminal trial and had its origins in the
religious persecution faced by Puritans during the 17th Century and eventually
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became law in England. By the time the Constitution was designed in the United
States the right against self-incrimination was well-established, especially as a
safeguard against the use of torture to compel testimony. The Fifth Amendment’s
“[No person]. . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.” However, extending the right, that was essentially a right to silence dur-
ing trial, to before trial such as during trial did not come until 1966 with the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Miranda v. Arizona.
The warning derived from this case is now ingrained and incorporated in the
United States legal system and culture, but our pop culture as well. The warning:
you have the right to remain silent, anything you say can and will be used against
you in a court of law, you have the right to an attorney, if you cannot a↵ord
an attorney one will be appointed to you, canonized by shows such as Law and
Order is a warning that most can now recite, without realizing where or when
this right was established. The warnings were originally a policy suggestion by
the Warren Court to help administer their ruling in Miranda that was actually a
consolidation of several di↵erent cases. The question before the court was whether
the Fifth Amendment right of protection against self-incrimination extended to
police interrogation.
The consolidation of cases that resulted in Miranda all had defendants who
were subject to a variety of di↵erent interrogation techniques and eventually con-
fessed guilt without ever being informed of his Fifth Amendment rights at any time
during the interrogation (Miranda v. Arizona, 1966). In each of the four cases the
defendant was isolated in a room without representation, and essentially cut-o↵
from the outside world, and in all four of the cases the confessions were admitted
at trial despite the lack of warning and coercive environment of the interrogation.
On March 13, 1963 Ernesto Miranda was arrested in his home on suspicion
of kidnapping and rape, and was subsequently brought to the police station for
questioning. The interrogation lasted two hours, during which the o cers obtained
an oral and written confession from Miranda. Both of these confessions were
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admitted into evidence at trial and used to convict Miranda, who was sentenced
to twenty to thirty years for rape and kidnapping.The confession was admitted
despite objections from his defense attorney on the grounds that Miranda was not
advised of his right to have an attorney present during the interrogation, and the
police admitted to this fact. An appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court a rmed his
conviction and held that Miranda’s constitutional rights were not violated because
he was not explicitly denied a right to counsel.
In 1966Miranda v. Arizona had finally made its way on appeal to the Supreme
Court, which also decided Vignera v. New York, Westover v. United States, and
California v. United States. All of these cases addressed the question of whether
or not Fifth Amendment protections extend beyond the courtroom and to police
interrogation. More specifically the case addressed whether “statements obtained
from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation” are allowed
to be used against an individual in a criminal trial and if “procedures which assure
that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself” are necessary (Miranda
v. Arizona, 1966).
The court issued a five to four decision on the matter in favor of Miranda, in
which they established and incorporated the Fifth Amendment decision outside of
criminal court proceedings and “serves to protect persons in all settings in which
their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled
to incriminate themselves (Miranda v. Arizona, 1966). Chief Justice Earl Warren
authored the decision, and was joined in the majority by Justices Black, Fortas,
Brennan, and Douglas. Chief Justice Warren wrote of the inherently coercive na-
ture of police interrogation and that these “pressures which work to undermine
the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would other-
wise do so freely.” Because of these pressures the court held that a suspect the
prosecution may not use statements arising from “custodial interrogation” unless
certain procedural safeguards are in place prior to questioning, which included
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“the defendant’s right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against
him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and
that if he cannot a↵ord an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires.”
The majority opinion in Miranda, gave way to the Miranda doctrine as well
as the Miranda warnings we know today. The doctrine is made up of a few key
elements outlined in the court holding’s which included the right against self-
incrimination during police interrogation and the right to counsel before as well as
during any questioning, and the procedural safeguards in place to ensure that the
suspect is aware of his rights. The decision went as far as to outline the needed
e↵ectiveness for the warning’s which inform the suspect of: his right to remain
silent and anything said can and will be used against the individual in court, his
right to an attorney and counsel will be available to him during interrogation
whether or not he can a↵ord one. This safeguard warning was adopted almost
verbatim by many police forces, and should sound familiar as the Miranda warning
described on Law & Order at the beginning of the discussion.
3.1 The Warren Court
At the time of Miranda the ruling was controversial, with some believing that the
ruling did not go far enough in protecting the rights of the criminally accused,
while others argued that the ruling handicapped police to such an extent that
another confession would never be obtained by police. This paper, however, is not
concerned with whether or not the decision in Miranda was correct, rather how
the decision shaped legal doctrine and the expansion or contraction of the Fifth
Amendment rights of the criminally accused. Over the last fifty years though,
an ongoing discussion born from Miranda v. Arizona and the Miranda doctrine
established in the Court’s opinion, that the Fifth Amendment and Miranda was
far from settled on the accused’s right against self-incrimination.
The decision in Miranda goes as far to say that the mere “fact of lengthy in-
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terrogation incommunicado incarceration before a statement is made is strong ev-
idence of involuntary relinquishment of the Fifth Amendment privilege (Dressler,
2013).” This important feature of voluntariness and absence of a coercive envi-
ronment is the central question that faced the court in the first challenge to the
Miranda doctrine, in which the decision was announced just seven days after Mi-
randa. The court found that had the case been heard while under Miranda the
decision would have been reversed summarily. The case, Davis v. North Carolina
involved an impoverished African-American man who was mentally handicapped,
with the schooling of that of a third or fourth grader, had escaped from a state
prison camp. When Davis was detained by police following his escape, he was
isolated in a detention cell for sixteen days, his only contact being with police who
intermittently interrogated him regarding a murder and rape to which he eventu-
ally confessed. During this time in police custody there is no evidence that the
suspect was advised of his rights until after police had secured a confession. The
written and oral confession were admitted into evidence despite pretrial objections
from the defense. The defendant was convicted and sentenced to death following
his trial.
The Supreme Court held in a 7-2 majority decision that petitioner’s confessions
were the “involuntary end product of coercive influences, and thus constitution-
ally inadmissible in evidence (Davis v. North Carolina, 1966).” In Davis the court
defined its duty to “examine the entire record and make an independent deter-
mination of the ultimate issue of voluntariness,” applying the English Common
Law principles of he totality of the circumstances voluntariness analysis (Davis v.
North Carolina, 1966). The court determined that the fact that the petitioner was
not advised of his right to remain silent or of his right to counsel at the outset of
interrogation, as well as the fact that no one other than the police spoke to the
petitioner for sixteen days. In Davis, as well as other early post-Miranda cases the
court is applying the traditional voluntariness analysis rather than new Miranda
doctrine because Miranda was not viewed as retroactive in its e↵ect and therefore
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not directly applicable in those cases.
The challenges and clarification ofMiranda continued with a case with another
decision coming the same week as Davis v. North Carolina. The case, Schmerber
v. California centered around the petitioner who was arrested for drunk driving
while receiving treatment for injuries in a hospital from an accident that he was
involved in. While the accused was being treated, a police o cer order the doctor
to take a blood sample on the grounds that Schmerber smelled of liquor. Although
Schmerber’s counsel advise him not to consent to the blood sample, and he did
not consent to the test. Despite his objections and the objection of counsel, the
blood test was admitted into evidence and used to convict the petitioner.
The petitioner rejected to the blood test as evidence on the grounds of his
right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizure, that his right to counsel
was violated, that he was denied due process and the blood test was a violation
of his right to be free from self-incrimination. While the court found in favor of
California regarding all issues raised by Schmerber, of note to this paper are the
rulings relating to the petitioner’s right to be free from self-incrimination. On
this matter, in a five to four decision, the majority held that the privilege against
self-incrimination only extends when the information provided by the accused is
testimonial or communicative in nature, and that a blood test was testimonial in
nature (Schmerber v. California, 1966). This second case, Schmerber v. Cali-
fornia, decided immediately after Miranda, helped to clarify the scope of what is
self-incrimination as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, although only Justice
Harlan’s concurrence mentioned Miranda directly.
The next case relating to Miranda and its newly established doctrine was
Sims v. Georgia, centered around the voluntariness of statements made by a
defendant and more so, the judicial procedure in the case. The petitioner of this
case claimed that his confession was not made voluntarily prior to said confession
being admitted into evidence, however the testimony to this point was conflicting
and the judge never made a ruling on the matter - instead leaving it to the jury
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to decide the matter. The Supreme Court held in an eight to one decision that
this was unacceptable, and that the judge must rule on the voluntariness of a
confession before it is admitted into evidence and heard by a jury. This case set
the precedent that self-incrimination are a judicial issue and not to be left to juries.
Clewis v. Texas was based on the “totality-of-circumstances” established by
the court’s opinion in Davis v. North Carolina a year early. This case involved
a petitioner, Clewis, who challenged that his confession was introduced into ev-
idence at trial despite objections that he did not give the confession voluntarily.
The court determined that Clewis’ statements were in fact involuntary as, among
other circumstances, was given very little food or water as well as deprived of
sleep, was not allowed to consult with counsel and remained unrepresented for a
lengthy period of time following his arrests, and had little contact with anyone be-
sides police o cers (Clewis v. Texas, 1967). This case was decided unanimously,
and once again by the Warren court. It was the first time since Davis that the
totality-of-circumstances test was applied in practice, with the rea rming its po-
sition in Miranda that involuntary statements amount to a violation of the Fifth
Amendment protections and will not be admissible in court.
While some of the cases immediately following the court’s landmark decision
regarding our Fifth Amendment rights are more tangentially related to Miranda,
the next case the court decided explicitly extends to the Miranda warnings in 1968
when the Court decided Mathis v. United States. The case’s petitioner claimed
that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated when the Internal Revenue Service
questioned Mathis, while he was already in state custody, about certain tax returns
in what the investigator claimed was a “routine investigation.” The investigator
never mentioned to Mathis that any evidence he gave could be used against him,
that he had a right to remain silent, and a right to counsel, or that one would be
appointed for him if he was unable to a↵ord counsel.
The district court and Court of Appeals upheld his conviction despite his
objections to the evidence obtained by the IRS investigator, however the Supreme
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Court, in a five to three decision, ruled in favor of Mathis. The court rejected
the IRS’s argument that no warnings were needed because tax investigations can
conclude in no charges being brought, or civil charges being filed. However, as the
IRS admits investigation can and often do lead to criminal charges being brought
as was the case here. Instead the court also ruled that custody is to be broadly
defined as any police custody as it is in Miranda and ruled that tax investigations
are not immune from the Miranda warning requirement to be given to a person
in custody, whether or not such custody is in connection with the case under
investigation (Mathis v. United States, 1968). This case once again expanded the
scope of Miranda this time to include tax investigations, and to add clarity to
“custody” as any state custody, although the court contended this was clear in
the original language of Miranda.
Harrison v. United States, the next case involving one’s Miranda rights, the
petitioner had made statements to the police that were later deemed inadmissible
on appeal, however during his initial trial he testified regarding these statements.
His testimony, although not the original statements, were read at his retrial and
he was again convicted, and again Harrison appealed claiming that his testimony
should now be inadmissible because it was fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree, a direct
result of his unconstitutional interrogation. The court held that his previous
trial testimony was in fact, also, inadmissible because “the same principle that
prohibits the use of illegally obtained confessions likewise prohibits the use of any
testimony impelled thereby (Harrison v. United States, 1968).” The court also
places the burden of proof on the government that the defendant would give the
same testimony if the illegal statements were never admitted, writing instead “the
Government must show that its illegal action did not induce petitioner’s testimony,
and no such showing was made here (Harrison v. United States, 1968).” This ruling
strengthened the Miranda protections that the court had previously established
and applied the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree to the Miranda doctrine.
Campbell Painting Corporation v. Reid was one the first early case decided
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in favor of the respondent and narrowed the scope of Miranda rather than ex-
panding it. The case involved Campbell Painting Corporation which was under
investigation for violation of a New York City statute involving bid rigging. New
York also had a law that upon refusal of ”a person” to testify before a grand
jury such person and any corporation of which he is an o cer or director shall
be disqualified for five years from contracting with any public authority and any
existing contracts may be canceled by the authority without penalty or damages.
When subpoenaed the then-president refused to testify before a grand jury as well
as sign his waiver of immunity, and claimed that since he was no longer president
the statute did not apply. The court rejected both of these arguments, ruling most
importantly that the “constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is a per-
sonal one, applying only to natural individuals,” and not corporations, along with
ruling that an appellant cannot claim this privilege for a corporation (Campbell
Painting Corporation v. Reid, 1968). This seven to two decision authored by Jus-
tice Fortas clearly narrowed Miranda and its doctrine, however did not undermine
its applicability to individuals in criminal proceedings.
Although Campbell was a narrowing of the right from self-incrimination, the
next case, Orozco v. Texas once again represented another liberal decision ex-
panding the rights of the criminally accused. Evidence used to convict Orozco
was his own testimony in which he admitted to police that he had been at the
scene of the crime, and to owning a pistol as well as the location of said pistol.
The police arrived at the boardinghouse where Orozco was residing and began to
question him. The pistol was obtained by information given to o cers at around
4 A.M. while still in the boardinghouse, never moving Orozco to the police station
for interrogation. Although he was not brought to the station or formally booked,
the o cers considered him to be “under arrest.” At trial, the testimony showed
that when the petitioner was detained at his residence and questioned he was
never informed of his Fifth Amendment’s - to right to remain silent, his right to
have the advice of a lawyer before making any statement, and his right to have a
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lawyer appointed to assist him if he could not a↵ord to hire one.
The state argued that because Orozco was questioned in his own bed, and
familiar surroundings that Miranda did not apply and the testimony was in fact
admissible. However, the Supreme Court did not agree - writing of “the abso-
lute necessity for o cers interrogating people ”in custody” to give the described
warnings (Orozvo v. Texas, 1968).” The court reiterated its opinion that when
any persons is interrogated and “otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way,” Miranda warnings are required. The six to two decision by
the court and the majority opinion by Justice Black emphasized that this was not
an expansion of Miranda in anyway but completely consistent with the holdings
in that case. Regardless, the ruling once again reinforced the importance of the
Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and reiterated that custody
does not occur solely at a place but is predicated on the restriction of freedoms as
well.
The court faced two questions in its next case Boulden v. Holman, however
only one of the questions brought by the petitioner was in regards to a violation
of his right from self-incrimination. In this case the petitioner was sentenced to
death and after the conviction was a rmed by the Supreme Court of Alabama
he requested federal habeas corpus relief on the grounds that the confession in-
troduced at trial was in violation of his right from self-incrimination. At the time
of his trial the District Court held a full hearing on the voluntariness of the con-
fession before it was introduced into evidence and found that no constitutional
violation was made with the appellate court a rming their decision regarding the
confession. The court wrote, in an unanimous decision, that although the issue
of voluntariness was a close one, they agree with the findings of the district court
and court of appeals (Boulden v. Holman, 1969). Boulden demonstrated that the
totality-of-the-circumstances and other relevant rulings relating to Miranda were
incorporated in the judicial system across the country.
The last case regarding the Fifth Amendment and Miranda that the Warren
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Court heard was Frazier v. Cupp, which involved two constitutional questions
relating to the Miranda doctrine as well as a two other questions for the court to
consider. The other two questions involved statements made by the prosecuting
attorney who erroneously but sincerely believed was going to testify, and a Sixth
Amendment search and seizure issue. The pertinent facts relating to Miranda
begin when Frazier was arrested and the o cers asked him a number of preliminary
questions, following this questioning he was advised of his rights under the Fifth
Amendment as well as his right to an attorney. As questioning continued Frazier
requested an attorney, however the o cer interrogating him convinced Frazier
to continue without counsel and he eventually signed a written confession. The
confession was admitted into trial over the petitioner’s objections. Along with the
question of whether the confession was made involuntarily because of the ignored
request for a lawyer was whether the trial judge adheard to the totality of the
circumstances test.
On both of these questions the court ruled in an unanimous decision for the
respondent with the majority opinion authored by Justice Marshall. The court
held it was possible that the o cer took the petitioner’s statement not as a request
but a comment made in passing, and therefore there was no denial of a right to
counsel (Fraizer v. Cupp, 1969). Additionally the court found that the district
court again correctly applied the “totality of the circumstances” and did not err
in finding the petitioner’s confession voluntary. The court again a rming their
a nity for this test in determining voluntariness and a rmation by the Supreme
Court in Frazier o↵ered further evidence that lower courts were applying the
doctrine satisfactorily. The final case of the Warren court regardingMiranda again
drew back the rights of the criminally accused that had been so vastly expanded
by the initial ruling; a lawyer must be asked for directly and forcefully and no
passing comment will su ce.
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3.2 The Burger Court
Harris v. New York was the first case heard by the Burger court, a notably more
conservative court than the prior Warren court. The case involved Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment challenges along with the Fifth Amendment challenge
we consider here. Harris centered around two sales of heroin by the defendant
to an undercover police o cer, and upon arrest made statements to the o cer
before he was mirandized. The statements were never used in trial, however when
Harris took the stand he claimed that he never made. The prosecution challenged
the truthfulness of this testimony, and then introduced the statements made the
petitioner as well as prior police testimony and forensic evidence. The trial judge
additionally instructed the jury to only consider this testimony as to the credibility
of the witness, and not as evidence for the trial. At no point did the prosecution try
to introduce the statements as evidence of guilt to the drug charges conceding to
the inadmissibility of the statements, and only as to whether or not the defendant
perjured himself.
Although the statement’s were never used as evidence for guilt, they were still
used to impeach Harris’ credibility and the use of these statements for perjury pur-
poses are what the court had to address and whether this constituted a violation
of the petitioner’s rights. The court held that although Miranda was still good
law, inadmissible evidence under the Miranda doctrine is not inadmissible against
an accused in the petitioner’s case was not barred for all purposes. The ruling by
the Court was a five to four decision in which it ruled that the petitioner’s rights
were not violated and further wrote that “that the shield provided by Miranda
could not be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from
the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances (Harris v. New York,
1971).” This ruling was again a narrowing of Miranda and the rights of the crim-
inally accused, although unsurprising given the composition of the court at the
time.
Our first plurality opinion that we encounter on this abbreviated history of the
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cases that have shaped the Miranda doctrine is California v. Byers. In this case
the respondent refused to supply the police with his name and address after he was
involved in an automobile accident that resulted in property damage. Although
this was in violation of California law, the respondent claimed that supplying
o cers with the information on the grounds that it would violate his privilege
against self-incrimination. The court did not share the petitioner’s view however.
The court ruled that Byers rights were not violated by supplying authorities with
his name and address, as this law was noncriminal and regulatory in nature, and
without self-reporting would be near impossible to accomplish, as well as the fact
that the “possibility of self-incrimination is not substantial, does not infringe the
privilege against self-incrimination (California v. Byers, 1971).” Additionally, the
court held that a ruling in favor of the respondent would be an extraordinary
extension so hold that such information is in fact testimonial in nature, which is
what the Fifth Amendment protects against. The possibility of involvement in
the legal process is not akin to testifying against one’s self.
The ruling in California v. Byers appears more pragmatic than anything else,
although a close five to four vote made it so. The decision is a conservative one
because at some level an individual’s rights are being limited in that the police can
require biographical information to be provided. However, one would hardly call
this an extensive expansion of police powers, or a severe burden on the criminally
accused. While this case may not have shifted the doctrine much, the next case
Kastigar v. United States did represent a substantial shift in one’s rights. Kastigar
dealt specifically with grand jury testimony, and what happens if an individual
invokes their Fifth Amendment right despite a state o↵er of immunity.
In Kastigar the petitioner was compelled by the state to testify in front of
a grand jury after receiving immunity where any testimony provided could not
be used against him in criminal proceedings. Despite this promise of immunity,
Kastigar still invoked of his Fifth Amendment right and was subsequently held in
contempt of court. The court had to determine whether forcing a witness to testify
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after he invokes his Fifth Amendment rights, when said witness has been granted
immunity, is legal. The court held that this compelled testimony is in fact consti-
tutional. In a five to two decision the court wrote that “transactional immunity
would a↵ord broader protection than the Fifth Amendment privilege (Kastigar v.
United States, 1972).” The court was saying that even though the government was
compelling testimony, the o↵er of immunity is extending an individual’s rights far
enough to allow this compulsion. Justice Powell authored the opinion that once
again provided a conservative ruling and found the court siding with the gov-
ernment with this ruling highlighted the departure from the pro-criminal rights
attitude of the previous Warren court and exemplified the conservative nature of
the Burger court.
The next case the court decided, Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Commission of
Investigation, also involved a witnesses rights when immunity has been granted.
In this case the appellant invoked his Fifth Amendment right will being ques-
tioned about organized crime, racketeering, and political corruption. Zicarelli was
then granted statutory immunity, however he argued that this protection was not
enough and he needed full transactional immunity citing his fear of foreign prose-
cution. The petitioner also argued that “responsive” answers is unconstitutionally
vague, although the New Jersey Supreme Court did not agree, finding that the
immunity o↵ered was in fact enough protection. The court agreed with this lower
court ruling, with another five to two majority in favor of the government.
The court held that the New Jersey statute was “coextensive” enough to pro-
tect one’s privilege against self-incrimination, and is therefore su cient enough to
compel testimony as ruled in Kastigar. The court also went further than Kastigar
in extending the government’s right to compel testimony, writing that “privilege
protects against real dangers, not remote and speculative possibilities” and that
Zicarelli did not convince the court that any real danger existed (Zicarelli v. New
Jersey State Commission of Investigation, 1972). This ruling continues the Burger
court’s trend of of limiting the rights of others in favor of extending government’s
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rights and abilities. The ruling once again a rmed the government’s right to com-
pel testimony for a grand jury as long as immunity is granted, and extended this
right to include immunity other than full transactional immunity.
After a number of decisively split decision’s by the court regarding the Fifth
Amendment, in Lefkowitz v. Turley the court delivered a unanimous ruling. The
case involved a challenge to a New York statute that required if a public contractor
refuses to waive immunity or testify concerning his state contracts then he will be
barred from further business with the state for five years. The appellees in this
case were architects who had various contracts with the city, and when they were
summoned to testify before a grand jury regarding criminal charges they refused
to sign waivers of immunity and their contracts were subsequently cancelled. The
architects believed that these actions by the state violated their Fifth Amend-
ment right against self-incrimination, and a District Court agreed with them. The
Supreme Court agreed with this ruling, holding that the state’s interests in “main-
taining the integrity of its civil service and of its transactions with independent
contractors, like other state concerns, cannot override the requirements of the
Fifth Amendment (Lefkowitz v Turley, 1973).”
The court also revisited its two previous decisions in Zicarelli and Kastigar,
stressing the importance of immunity when the state compels testimony, and in the
absence of testimony ruling that testimony cannot be compelled. The court went
on to say though, that the state can require employees or contractors testimony and
cancel contracts otherwise only if immunity is “su cient to supplant their Fifth
Amendment privilege.” This unanimous ruling finally put a stop to the continued
growing ability of the government to compel a witness from individuals and once
again stressed the importance of immunity if testimony is to be compelled. The
court made a decisive decision and set firm limits for the government, and ensuring
that the people will not be subject to compulsion without a promise of protection
from criminal proceedings.
The court followed up its unanimous decision in Lefkowitz v. Turley with a
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near unanimous, eight to one decision in Michigan v. Tucker. In this case the ac-
cused was advised of his right to remain silent and right to a lawyer, although not
the right to have a lawyer provided for him if he could not a↵ord one. When the
respondent was questioned by the police after these warnings he gave statements
that incriminated him that were then used in his trial and eventually lead to a
conviction. The arrest and conviction of the respondent predated Miranda, and
the court admitted that the full procedural safeguards were not provided to the
respondent. However, the court also found that nothing the police did deprived
respondent of his privilege against self-incrimination and thus no rights were vio-
lated. The court also ruled that “the failure to advise respondent of his right to
appointed counsel had no bearing upon the reliability of Henderson’s testimony
(Michigan v. Tucker, 1974).” Ultimately, the court ruled that the evidence ob-
tained was admissible, and Tucker’s conviction was upheld. Although this case
was not ruled in favor of the criminally accused, it did not specifically limit one’s
right against self incrimination. Instead the ruling provided important clarifica-
tion that Fifth Amendment claims must actually relate to compelled or coerced
testimony. Even with this, the ruling was still a conservative one in favor of the
government.
The next case allowed the court to revisit its ruling in Harris v. New York.
In Harris the court ruled statements given by a defendant in violation of his
Fifth Amendment rights and the Miranda doctrine, and therefore inadmissible in
court can be used for impeachment purposes. In Oregon v. Hass the defendant
was mirandized upon arrest and requested to telephone a lawyer, however police
informed the suspect that he could not speak to his lawyer until he arrived at the
station. Between the time the suspect requested a lawyer and reaching the station
he provided inculpatory evidence, that was subsequently ruled inadmissible for the
prosecution’s case. In the court’s holding in Oregon v. Hass however, the court
decided that such information is admissible in impeachment proceedings if, as the
defendant did in this case, testified to the contrary after the evidence for the case
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in chief. This six to two decision narrowed the rights of the criminally accused
by rea rming Harris and allowing impeachment proceedings to use previously
inadmissible evidence.
The Fifth Amendment allows an individual to invoke the right to remain silent,
but what happens when that silence is used against them in court? This question
is what the court had to decided in United States v. Hale. The case involved a man
accused of robbery who refused to speak with the police when questioned about
the money found on his persons. At trial the prosecutor attempted to impeach
the respondent and caused Hale to admit that he had not o↵ered the alibi to the
police at the time of his arrest, the judge told the jury to disregard this line of
questioning but did not declare a mistrial. The Court of Appeals however, ruled
that the inquiry into the defendant’s silence impermissibly prejudiced the jury and
violated his Miranda rights as guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment.
In Hale, the Supreme Court agreed with the appellant court and granted the
respondent a new trial on the grounds that the “respondent’s silence during police
interrogation lacked significant probative value, and, under these circumstances,
any reference to his silence carried with it an intolerably prejudicial impact (United
States v. Hale, 1974).” The court believed that using one’s right to remain silent
in an adversarial way was a violation of the right. The majority opinion authored
by Justice Marshall also held that Hale’s previous silence was not enough to garner
“inconsistent testimony” especially since he had repeatedly asserted his innocence
throughout the proceedings. This decision by the court protected the rights of the
criminally accused and ensured them that their silence could not be used against
them in trial proceedings. The liberal decision by the court was an important one
to guarantee that Miranda and the right to remain silent would not be infringed
upon.
Two years later, the court faced its next challenge regarding Miranda when
it heard Brown v. Illinois the court had to determine whether a suspect’s state-
ments were admissible when he had been properly mirandized but arrested without
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probable cause or a warrant. The accused petitioned to suppress the statements
however they were admitted and on appeal the Illinois State Supreme Court rec-
ognized that the arrest was in fact illegal, the statements made were admissible
because the Miranda statements were enough to break “the causal connection
between the illegal arrest and the giving of the statements.” The United States
Supreme Court disagreed with the State Supreme Court that providing Miranda
warnings were not enough to break this causal connection. The Illinois court erred
in finding that any subsequent statement, was admissible so long as it was vol-
untary and not coerced in violation of the Fifth Amendment (Brown v. Illinois,
1975).
The court believed that the Fifth Amendment was a secondary issue in this
case though, with it only needing to be considered after the Fourth Amendment
violation per Wong Sun. Although Miranda can be an important factor in deter-
mining whether statements can be admitted or whether they are “fruits” of an
illegal search, the burden is on the state to prove admissibility. The court’s six
to three decision in Brown ruled that Miranda alone does not determine admis-
sibility if other constitutional violations exist and, that if statements are to be
admitted, the burden of proof lays with the prosecution that no constitutional
violation occurred. The next case that appeared on the court docket once again
posed a new and unique question to the justices that was not addressed in the
original Miranda doctrine.
In the case Michigan v. Moseley, the respondent was originally arrested for a
series of robberies, upon arrest he was properly mirandized. Moseley agreed to
questioning though eventually stating that he no longer wanted to speak where-
upon the interrogation immediately stopped and he was brought to a cell. A few
hours later, a di↵erent police o cer brought Moseley out of his cell to question
him about a murder unrelated to the robberies, before questioning about the mur-
der Moseley was once again read his Miranda rights. During the course of this
second interrogation Moseley made statements implicating himself in the murder
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and despite a motion to suppress, the statements were eventually used to convict
the petitioner of murder. The defendant appealed his conviction and when the
case reached the Supreme Court they were tasked with answering the question:
Does the re-interrogation of a suspect who had previously invoked his right to
silence violate the suspect’s Fifth Amendment rights as decided under Miranda v.
Arizona?
The court held that re-interrogation after the right to silence is invoked is
not a “per se violation of Miranda rights, as long as the suspect’s invocation of
his rights is honored (Michigan v. Moseley, 1975). The court’s original findings
in Miranda do not address re-interrogation after an invocation at all, whether it
is or is not permitted, and if it is permissible under what circumstances. The
particulars of this case - the amount of time that had passed between the first
and second interrogation, the fact that the respondent was again read his rights
before re-interrogation, and that is right to silence had originally been honored
- all played a part in the court’s decision. Beyond this case, the court held that
Miranda only required that the suspect’s right to refuse to answer questions be
honored, but not that the right extended indefinitely and re-interrogation could
occur. The conservative ruling once again carved out an exception to the right to
remain silent and when how that right is applicable.
With the court deciding to hear the next case, Garner v. United States, they
were able to decide another question regarding what is and what is not compul-
sory self-incrimination. In this case the petitioner filed a tax return in which
he admitted to gambling; this information was then used in a federal gambling
conspiracy case despite objections over a Fifth Amendment violation. The court
returned a unanimous decision on this matter, writing that no violation occurred
because the petitioner made incriminating disclosures on his tax return rather
than invoking his Fifth Amendment. The court did not believe that “there [was]
no factor depriving petitioner of the free choice to refuse to answer” and that if
one does not claim the privilege to remain silent, his disclosures cannot be consid-
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ered compelled (Garner v. United States, 1976). The court essentially established
that if you do not claim your right to remain silent when answering questions, you
cannot claim that your right was violated in another conservative decision that
was pro-prosecutorial.
The case Beckwith v. United States was another case involving taxes, how-
ever this case centered around an IRS investigation similar to Mathis v. United
States. In Beckwith the petitioner made statements incriminating himself during a
noncustodial interview in a criminal tax investigation, and was never mirandized.
The statements were held admissible by the trial judge, and the Supreme Court
upheld this decision in a seven to one vote. The majority held in the ruling that
the statements should be admissible because the petitioner was never brought
into custody. The court reiterated that Miranda does not apply except when
”questioning initiated by law enforcement o cers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way
(Beckwith v. United States, 1976).” Beckwith v. United States once again was a
conservative ruling that narrowed the scope of MIranda, this time ruling that it
does not apply unless custody has been established, and freedom of movement is
restricted.
The case United States v. Manujando brought another unanimous decision
from the court, and another case revolving around grand jury testimony. In this
case the respondent was informed of right to counsel, his right to remain silent and
that anything other than truthful answers could result in perjury charges. Even
after these warnings, Manujando made false statements regarding his involvement
in the sale of narcotics and was subsequently charged with perjury. The respondent
successfully suppressed his grand jury testimony at District Court which ruled that
he was entitled to full Miranda warnings. However, when this case reached the
Supreme Court on appeal, they did not agree with the lower court ruling. The
Supreme Court held that individuals called before a grand jury as a witness are
not entitled to fullMiranda warnings, and that “failure to give such warnings is no
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basis for having false statements made to the grand jury suppressed in a subsequent
prosecution of the witness for perjury based on those statements ( United States v.
Manujando, 1976).” This unanimous court ruling was a strong conservative signal
and one that once restated that Miranda applies to the criminally accused and
not all persons in all legal situations.
The first Miranda case over which Justice John Paul Stevens once again re-
visited the issues addressed in United States v. Hale, the prosecution using a
defendant’s silence against him. Doyle v. Ohio allowed the court to re-address
this issues when the petitioners, Doyle and Wood, gave exculpatory testimony at
trial that they had never o↵ered the police or the prosecution. The defendants
were then cross-examined as to why they never o↵ered up the exculpatory evidence
to police, despite their counsels objections to this line of questioning.
The court held that this line of questioning violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s due process clause because “post-arrest silence following such warnings is
insolubly ambiguous (Doyle v. Ohio, 1976).” The court further held that by using
an arrestee’s silence, which is a guaranteed right under Miranda, to impeach an
explanation o↵ered later on at trial is fundamentally unfair. After all, the court
wrote, Miranda is a promise that one’s silence will not be used against him as
evidence. This liberal opinion by the court guaranteed to the criminally accused
that their silence would be respected and that the right to remain silent will not
and cannot be used against you. After this expansion of rights and rea rmation of
Hale, the Supreme Court once again revisited grand jury testimony and its recent
ruling in Manujando when it heard United States v. Wong.
The case, like others the Court had heard, featured a defendant who perjured
himself when giving grand jury testimony. After the petitioner gave false testi-
mony, the court held that such testimony is not entitled to the grounds on that no
e↵ective warning of the Fifth Amendment warning was given. The Court further
held that the Fifth Amendment does not condone perjury, which is not justified
“even the predicament of being forced to choose between incriminatory truth and
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falsehood, as opposed to a refusal to answer (United States v. Wong, 1977).” This
ruling was consistent with Manujando, as well as the Court reiterating that the
legal system o↵ers alternatives for challenging the government and “lying is not
one of them.” The case once again demonstrated the court’s contempt for perjury
and that compelled testimony in a grand jury setting must be truthful, or not at
all. However, this is not the last time that the Court would have to decide how
to treat grand jury testimony, as it would be addressed again in their next case
United States v. Washington.
In a grand jury investigation for a car theft the petitioner made statements
implicating himself. He was informed of his right to remain silent, as well as sev-
eral other warnings consistent with Miranda, testified nonetheless and was then
indicted for the theft. The respondent was never informed that the he may be in-
dicted for his testimony, and because of this a lower court held that his testimony
was obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. The Supreme Court
disagreed however, ruling that the respondent had received a set of comprehensive
warnings which “dissipated any element of compulsion to self-incrimination that
might otherwise have been present (United States v. Washington, 1977).” The
majority also wrote that Miranda protections are satisfactory for grand jury pro-
ceedings and that the a defendant’s rights are “neither impaired nor enlarged” by
such proceedings. The court’s position on grand jury testimony remained stead-
fast through Washington and Chief Justice Burger o↵ered another conservative
opinion. The court would continue its trending of rea rming prior decisions in
Lefkowitz v. Cunningham.
A New York statute requiring unimmunized testimony or the loss of a power-
ful political o ce were the options that one could choose from under this statute.
The court held that this was unconstitutional as it essentially compelled testi-
mony from the respondent. Most importantly the court held that the “Govern-
ment cannot penalize assertion of the constitutional privilege against compelled
self-incrimination by imposing sanctions to compel testimony that has not been
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immunized (Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 1977).” This writing by the majority en-
sured that one’s Fifth Amendment rights remain intact and that threats to one’s
livelihood, among other factors, cannot be made absent immunity.
The Supreme Court’s next case once again brought the issue of immunized
grand jury testimony to the forefront. The case, New Jersey v. Portash, involved a
public employee’s grand jury testimony that was given under a grant of immunity.
When the respondent was brought up on charges of misconduct in o ce and
extortion, the trial judge ruled that the grand jury testimony could be used to
impeach his testimony if he testified. As a result of this ruling Portash did not
testify, and was subsequently convicted. On appeal the New Jersey Supreme Court
reversed the trial judges’ decision and ordered a retrial, a decision the United
States Supreme Court agreed with. The high court, in a seven to two majority
opinion, held that it was a violation of the Fifth Amendment.
The Court wrote the respondent’s testimony before the grand jury under a
grant of immunity could not constitutionally be used against him in the later
criminal trial. . The court further wrote that because immunized testimony is
coerced testimony and “any balancing of interests so as to take into account the
interest in preventing perjury as held in Harris v. New York and Oregon v. Hass
(New Jersey v. Portash, 1979).” The court once again had to balance the interest
in truthful grand jury testimony with an individual’s right from coerced testimony;
this time ruling liberally, by protecting an individual from its coerced testimony
from being used against him.
North Carolina v. Butler, the next case on the Court’s docket, forced the court
to answer the question of whether or not an express waiver of rights is required by
Miranda. The case involved Wille Thomas Butler who was properly mirandized
and indicated that he understood his rights but refused to sign the waiver the
o cer provided him with stating such. Butler did however, agree to talk to police,
but when that testimony was later introduced to be used against him, he moved
to suppress, a motion that the North Carolina Supreme Court agreed with. When
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the case eventually made its way to the Supreme Court, a five to three majority
held that express waiver was not in fact required by the Miranda doctrine. The
conservative opinion continued that it was up to the lower courts to decide if an
individual waived its implied rights, once again limiting the rights of the criminally
accused and expanding the ability of police to interrogate around Miranda.
The court delivered another conservative ruling in Fare v. Michael when it
ruled that a juvenile waived his right when he agreed to speak to police after
requesting his probation o cer. The Court had to answer whether or not, after
being properly mirandized, a juvenile who has asked for his probation o cer but
not a lawyer trigger the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination.
In a five to four decision, the court held that the request does not invoke such
protection, and that court’s most continue to consider the totality of the circum-
stance to determine waiver of rights. Additionally, they found that Michael did
knowingly waive his rights.
With the next case the Internal Revenue Service once again found its way in
front of the Supreme Court when it compelled an individual to produce hand-
writing samples during an investigation. The question before the court in United
States v. Euge was whether this was within the IRS’ power and if it was a consti-
tutional violation on the basis of a Fifth Amendment violation. In a six to three
decision the court answered this question by ruling that the IRS was within its
right to force a handwriting sample from the respondent and that no Fifth Amend-
ment violation of Euge’s rights occurred. The court held that handwriting was
not testimonial evidence, similar to Schember v. California where it was held that
blood samples are not compelled testimony. The ruling once again extended the
state’s ability to compel an individual to produce evidence and marked another
conservative decision by the Burger court.
In what was becoming a familiar pattern with the Miranda progeny cases, the
question of if grand jury testimony was permissible was once again before the
Supreme Court. This time the court had two questions before to it answer in
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United States v. Apfelbaum. Both concerned itself with 18 U.S.C. § 6002, which
protected compelled testimony given under immunity from being used against
the defendant except for “a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or
otherwise failing to comply with the order.” The court first had to decide that if
the respondent, who had given false testimony, had his rights violated when the
testimony was then used against him and if so, how much of the testimony may
be used. The court answered both these questions unanimously, ruling that the
exemption is perfectly constitutional as untruthful testimony is not protected by
the Fifth Amendment. Additionally, the Court unanimously held that Congress
created a blanket exemption between truthful and untruthful testimony, and that
once a defendant commits perjury his testimony is no longer immunized or barred
from use against him. These conservative rulings once again rea rmed the court’s
decision to protect only truthful testimony, and that if an individual decides to give
untruthful testimony he will not be protected from perjury. The Supreme Court
has repeatedly held that the Fifth Amendment cannot be applied retroactively
and in situations where immunity has been accepted.
The Court’s next case, Rhode Island v. Innis, provides one of the classic deci-
sions of the Miranda progeny cases. In this case the respondent was arrested and
unarmed at the time, was read his Miranda rights upon arrest, and then requested
to speak to a lawyer. While in transit to the police station, an o cer commented
on how disastrous it could be if a young child from the nearby handicapped school
found the shotgun involved in the robbery Innis was accused of. Upon hearing
this comment, Innis told the police to turn the car around so he could show them
where said shotgun was. The Supreme Court eventually became tasked with an-
swering the question if this passing comment made by the o cer amounted to
“interrogation” and violated the suspect’s Fifth Amendment rights as described
under Miranda.
The court once again issued a conservative ruling, with a six to three majority
holding thatMiranda applied only when a suspect was under “express questioning
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or its functional equivalent.” The court decided that these passing comments by
the police did not amount to anything near interrogation. Additionally, they
wrote in the opinion that under Miranda the police “should know are reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response from the subject,” and that the o cers’
conversation had no reasonable expectation to elicit an incriminating response.
Again, limiting the rights of the criminally accused and allowing more leeway for
the police (Rhode Island v. Innis,1980).
Estelle v. Smith was a case that entangled the Fifth Amendment with the
controversial and often studied issue of the death penalty. In Texas, after the
respondent was found guilty of murder, and was subsequently sentenced to death
by a jury after answering questions relating to his likelihood to commit violent
crimes. Part of the testimony at sentencing was from a psychiatrist who examined
Smith, and then testified to those findings. This testimony is at the center of the
questions before the Supreme Court, and where the Court found a constitutional
error in admitting the testimony. The defendant received no warnings that his
meeting with the doctor could be used against him, which created a Fifth Amend-
ment violation (Estelle v. Smith, 1981). This unanimous liberal decision held that
the privilege extended to all parts of criminal proceedings and anytime his own
testimony may be used against him.
The court followed up its unanimous decision in Estelle v. Smith with an-
other unanimous decision in Edwards v. Arizona, although this case centered
around the admission of a confession after re-interrogation. Unlike in Michigan v.
Moseley, which involved re-interrogation regarding a di↵erent crime, in Edwards
the accused was questioned about the same crime and after invoking his right to
counsel rather than right to silence. The court had to determine whether or not
the testimony given at the re-interrogation of the suspect a day later and after he
again was read his rights was constitutional. The court ruled unanimously that
the police acted unconstitutionally and the suspects confession should never have
been admitted into trial. Although the opinion acknowledged that he may have
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voluntarily waived his rights, once counsel is invoked the waiver must be volun-
tary and intelligent (Estelle v. Smith, 1981). The court further held that a valid
waiver of the right to counsel “cannot be established by showing only that he
responded to police-initiated interrogation after being again advised of his rights”
unless the criminally accused “initiated further communication” or counsel was
present (Estelle v. Smith, 1981). This ruling protected the criminally accused to
a new degree especially once the right to counsel was invoked as well as putting
new limits on the police’s ability to question suspects.
The next case marks the first Fifth Amendment challenge heard by Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor and a third straight unanimous decision by the court. This
time the court revisited the issue of compelled blood tests which involved a South
Dakota statute held that refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test could result in
the loss of one’s license. In South Dakota v. Neville the respondent was warned
he could lose his license if he failed to submit to the test after being pulled over
on suspicion of drunk driving but not that failure to do so would be used against
him in court. The South Dakota Supreme Court held that this was a violation of
Neville’s privilege against self-incrimination but the Supreme Court unanimously
disagreed.
In a seven to zero decision the court held that the admission into evidence of the
refusal does not violate his Fifth Amendment rights because the test is legitimate.
The subsequent evidence of refusal is no less legitimate as evidence because the
“State o↵ers a second option of refusing the test, with the attendant policies for
making that choice (South Dakota v. Neville, 1983).” The court furthered its
opinion on this question when it held that the police’s failure to warn him the
suspect that his refusal may be used against him is not fundamentally unfair. The
unanimous majority reasoning that it was not done to deceive him nor was it an
implicit promise not to use the evidence. In South Dakota v. Neville the police
are once again absolved of any wrong doing and the conservative ruling allowed
more leeway in how to legislate suspects or the criminally accused.
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The court’s first plurality opinion on the Fifth Amendment occurred in Oregon
v. Bradshaw when the respondent began speaking with police after invoking his
right to an attorney and remain silent when initially arrested. He eventually agreed
to take a polygraph test after he initiated a conversation with police and was re-
read his rights several times. Unlike Edwards though, the court held that there was
no violation of Bradshaw’s rights. The high court wrote that Bradshaw initiated
the conversation, and therefore no violation of the Edwards rule, which needed the
express waiver of rights after asking for counsel, occurred. The Supreme Court
agreed with the trial court, that when examining the totality of the circumstances
of this case, the waiver was express and voluntary. Although, four justices did sign
a majority that wrote of a “two-step test” to determine if a defendant initiated
conversation and if the waiver was voluntary and intelligent, this test failed to
garner a majority form the court.
The next case United States v. Doe produced a split decision, one liberal ruling
and one conservative ruling, with the respective answers to the questions before
the court. In Doe, the respondent was asked to produce business records, without
any promise of immunity, during a federal grand jury investigation into corruption.
The respondent refused and the court was tasked with determining if providing
the records was compelled testimony and whether this compulsion amounted to
a violation of the Fifth Amendment. The Court answered the first question,
with six to three majority, that the records were not privileged under the Fifth
Amendment. The opinion stating that “where the preparation of business records
is voluntary, no compulsion is present” and that no where does the respondent
claim the records were prepared involuntarily (United States v. Doe, 1984).” This
conservative decision once again gave a very narrow definition to what is compelled
and what is testimonial in nature, allowing the government to subpoena more
information from an individual.
The answer to the second question, however, was a liberal decision which pro-
tected the rights of the criminally accused. While the court held that documents
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may be requested, that if such a request comes it must be accompanied by a
grant of immunity. As with past issues relating to compelled testimony in front
of a grand jury the court continues to uphold that no compulsion shall take place
without immunity. Although this case involved documents from an individual
rather than statements made by an individual the liberal ruling, as in past cases,
was the majority’s opinion. The court followed up these to six to three deci-
sions with another six to three decision when asked if whether or not to suppress
statements made to a probation o cer.
The respondent in Minnesota v. Murphy was a man who made incriminating
statements to his probation o cer regarding a rape and murder he committed.
When Murphy made these statements he was not under arrest and the trial court
found the confession to be voluntary, however the Minnesota Supreme Court held
that the confession was inadmissible as the probation o cer know his statements
may be incriminating and were a violation of Murphy’s Fifth Amendment rights.
When the United States Supreme Court decided the case, they reversed the de-
cision, holding instead that while the state may require an individual to meet
with their probation o cer, this does not create an exception to the rule that one
must assert the privilege against self-incrimination. The court’s conservative rul-
ing allows statements made to a probation o cer, specifically those about crimes
unrelated to probation are admissible. Murphy was not granted a violation of his
Fifth Amendment rights because he never tried to assert these rights.
The public safety exception to theMiranda doctrine was carved out in the case
New York v. Quarles. This case involved a man matching a suspect’s description
who was stopped, and during the o cer’s frisk an empty holder was detected. The
empty holster prompted the o cer to question the suspect regarding the location
of his firearm to which the respondent answered, and was then arrested and read
his rights. The court was tasked with determining if this violated Miranda, and
held it did not. The court wrote the public safety exception into existence as the
location of the gun was of immediate interest as so no one was injured by the gun
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or that it did not fall into the hands of another assailant. This immediate interest
in keeping the public safe was a conservative decision and the basis as to why
a Fifth Amendment violation did not occur even though Quarles was questioned
without his rights being read.
The court followed up New York v. Quarles with another two question case,
Berkemer v. McCarty which centered around a man arrested following a tra c
stop. An o cer pulled McCarty over after he was observed driving erratically
and had him perform a “balance test” which McCarty failed. The o cer then
questioned McCarty as to whether he was under the influence of any drugs or
alcohol to which McCarty answered that he had consumed beer and marijuana.
Following this admission he was arrested and brought to the station where the
o cer once again questioned him about any drugs or alcohol that may have been
in his system - all of this occurring without any the suspect being read anyMiranda
warnings. McCarty challenged the admissibility of these statements on the grounds
that he was never read his rights and the court had to decide if the questioning
that occurred at the tra c stop was a Fifth Amendment violation absent any
warnings, and if the questioning at the police station was a violation of the Fifth
Amendment.
In both of these questions the court ruled unanimously. To answer the first
question, regarding the questions asked when McCarty was pulled over, the court
found that no violation of rights had occurred. Justice Marshall wrote for the court
that prior to formal arrest the suspect was not under in custody and therefore
Miranda did not apply, and compared the stop to a non-custodial ‘Terry stop.’
However, a liberal decision followed this conservative one when the court answered
the second question. This time holding that McCarty was entitled to be read his
rights when the police formally arrested him following the tra c stop and the
statements he made at the station were thus inadmissible. Although the petitioner
argued that an exception should be made for misdemeanors or arrests following
tra c stops, Justice Marshall rejected this in his opinion holding that Miranda
40
was necessary anytime custody occurred.
The court heard a challenge to the federal government’s requirement for males
to register for the Selective Service System in order to qualify for financial aid
from a college or university following Berkemer v. McCarty. The respondent in
the case, Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group,
believed that it was a Fifth Amendment violation for the federal government to
require that men disclose to their universities whether or not they had registered
for the draft. The court, in a six to two decision, held that there was no compulsion
present in this law because one chooses to seek financial aid, absent a student being
compelled no Fifth Amendment violation can occur. The court held that requiring
a student to reveal whether or not he had registered in order to receive financial
aid was not the same as forcing him to incriminate himself.
The next question that faced the court involved a suspect, who upon arrest,
made unprompted incriminating statements in his home before he was mirandized.
After he was transported to the station, the sheri↵ then read Elstad his rights,
and the suspect elected to execute a written confession. The case, Oregon v.
Elstad, asked the court to answer if Elstad written confession was involuntary due
to the statements he made at his home before his rights were read to him. On
this matter the court issued a conservative opinion, holding that the unwarned
statements Elstad made are inadmissible. However, the subsequent statements
after he was mirandized, and if the statements are knowingly and voluntarily,
need not be suppressed. With this holding, ”the mere fact that a suspect has
made an unwarned admission does not warrant a presumption of compulsion,”
the court issued another conservative decision and furthered the ability of the
government when prosecuting crimes (Oregon v. Elstad, 1985).
With the court’s next case, Moran v. Burbine they had to once again consider
if police action violated the rights of the accused. In this case the police arrested
a suspect, and questioned him during which time he signed three waiver’s to
demonstrate that he knowingly waived his right to an attorney. The accused was
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originally brought in on robbery charges the police discovered his connection to
a murder, and following questioning he signed three statements admitting to said
murder. While this was happening the respondent’s sister contacted a lawyer on
behalf of her brother on what she believed were only robbery charges. Burbine
was unaware of his sister’s actions and when the attorney contacted police about
Burbine, he was told that Burbine would not be questioned until the next day and
never informed the accused about the lawyer.
The court then had to determine if an unrequested attorney attempting to
contact a defendant who was subsequently given misleading information about the
investigation as well as the police’s failure to notify the defendant of such contact
amounted to a violation of the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The court answered this question with a resounding no, in a six to three vote,
which held that the failure to inform the suspect of the lawyers call did not a↵ect
Burbine’s ability to waive his rights. Justice O’Connor further explained in her
majority opinion that the suspect was never formally charged with murder so the
right to counsel had yet to attach, and the waivers show that Burbine was aware
of his rights and the confession was uncoerced (Moran v. Burbine, 1986).
The next cases the court heard was a consolidation of two cases from Michigan,
Michigan v. Jackson and Michigan v. Bladel which the court consolidated into
Michigan v. Jackson. Both of which involved the police interrogating a suspect
and producing a confession after the suspect had requested and been appointed
counsel but before he could meet with his attorney. The court determined in
a six to three decision that the defendant’s rights were violated when he was
interrogated after requesting and being appointed counsel but before he was able
to meet with said attorney. The Supreme Court held in a liberal decision that
initiating such an interrogation violated both the Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination as well as the Sixth Amendment right to an attorney. The only
way interrogation or additional questioning could occur without an attorney after
one had been requested is if the defendant initiated the conversation.
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The court had another opportunity in its next case to either expand or con-
tract where the Fifth Amendment applied. In Allen v. Illinois the petitioner was
convicted and the state was attempting to have him declared a “sexual dangerous
person.” The court relied on psychiatrist testimony, among other witness testi-
mony and evidence to make the case at a bench trial, and eventually won their
case. The court had to decide if the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Person Act repre-
sented civil or criminal proceedings and if during those proceedings the petitioner
was guaranteed his Fifth Amendment rights. The court ruled in favor of Illinois,
holding that this was not a criminal proceeding but because of the details and
required prior conviction this was a civil matter. Allen, therefore, was not enti-
tled to his right against self-incrimination as the right only extended to criminal
matters, marking another conservative decision and a narrowing of an individual’s
rights.
3.3 The Rehnquist Court
The first Miranda case of the Rehnquist court comes next in Colorado v. Con-
nelly, where Connelly walked up to a police o cer unprompted and confessed to a
murder. Upon this admission, the o cer then immediately mirandized Connelly,
although he indicated he would like to keep speaking. At trial, it was revealed
the respondent had schizophrenia and his attorney attempted to suppress the
statements on the grounds that they were not made voluntarily. However, the
court held that no element of government coercion occurred, noting that the Fifth
Amendment and Miranda protect against government coercion and “goes no fur-
ther than that (Colorado v. Connelly, 1986). The seven to two decision marked
a conservative start for the Rehnquist court, limiting to how far coercion goes
and who must be doing the coercing for a violation to occur. The next case the
Rehnquist court heard allowed them to revisit Edwards v. Arizona.
The case Connecticut v. Barrett centered around whether the oral statements
a suspect made, after being read and signing a waiver that he understood his
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rights, refused to sign any written statements without counsel. Despite this, he
never explicitly expressed a right to counsel, and indicated that he would still
speak to the police at which time he admitted involvement regarding the sexual
assault, which he was under investigation for. The court ruled that his refusal to
write a confession had no bearing on his oral statements, and that the police did
not “trick” or otherwise coerce the suspect and his decision to speak was volun-
tary. The court wrote that “Miranda rules were designed to protect defendants
from being compelled by the government to make statements, they also give de-
fendants the right to choose between speech and silence (Connecticut v. Barrett,
1987).” The unanimous vote by the court sent a strong signal that if you decide
to voluntarily waive your right to speak, your Fifth Amendment rights’ are not
automatically invoked.
The court next addressed whether or not a suspect’s rights were violated if he
was not informed about the crimes he is to be questioned about relevant to his
informed decision about his waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights. With another
seven to two majority in Colorado v. Spring the court held that the Constitution
does not require the suspect to know every nuance about the interrogation, rather
just that it is understood anything he says can be used against him. The state-
ments were not coerced and knowledge of the content of the interrogation does
not a↵ect the suspect’s ability to understand his rights. The court once again
expanding the government’s ability during questioning and placing the burden on
the suspect to invoke his rights.
The court finally returns to a case in Arizona when it decided Arizona v.
Mauro, where the suspect’s conversation with his wife was knowingly observed and
recorded after Fifth Amendment rights had been invoked and honored. The po-
lice only observed the meeting and no questioning took place, however the defense
moved to suppress the statements made during this time. The court disagreed, re-
lying on Innis and Miranda that “questioning or its functional equivalent” did not
take place and therefore no violation of rights occurred. A number of case-specific
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factors such as concerns for the wife’s safety were used to justify the o cer’s pres-
ence but more broadly a hope of confession did not constitute a violation as well
as the voluntariness of the statements lead to the five to four ruling in Arizona’s
favor. The court reinforcing that in order for a violation to occur an interrogation
must take place, and that an indefinite right to be free from self-incrimination
does not exist.
In Greer v. Miller the Rehnquist court had the chance to revisit Doyle v. Ohio
and decide if a prosecutor questioning a defendant’s silence, which was objected to
and sustained, required a reversal of conviction or ruling of a mistrial. The court
held that no reversal was required as no Doyle violation occurred, the trial court
immediately sustained an objection as well as instructed the jury to disregard the
line of questioning. Ultimately the respondent’s silence was protected so no vio-
lation of rights was sustained, and the jury was not “infected” enough to warrant
a reversal in another six to three conservative ruling by the court.
Justice Anthony Kennedy voted on his first Fifth Amendment case in Braswell
v. United States where the court ruled that corporations are not entitled to Fifth
Amendment rights. The case involved a custodian of a corporation’s records who
refused a subpoena on Fifth Amendment self-incrimination grounds. The court
held however, that the records belonged to an individual in a representative rather
than individual capacity so this personal privilege cannot apply. The court, in this
five to four conservative decision, also expressed concern about the government’s
ability to prosecute white collar crime and enforce regulations.The court once again
limited the application of the Fifth Amendment, limiting it to only individuals
with its ruling in Braswell. The court’s next case also involved how far Fifth
Amendment protections go when the petitioner in Doe v. United States failed to
turn over bank records during grand jury proceedings.
While initially producing some foreign bank records, Doe refused to produce
additional documentation for the grand jury investigation instead invoking his
Fifth Amendment rights. He was then ordered to sign forms which would allow
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the foreign banks to release any and all accounts he was able to withdraw from, and
Doe again refused on Fifth Amendment grounds, citing that this was compelled
testimony. This time the court revisited its decisions in Fisher, and United States
v. Doe, 465 U. S. 605 and ruled that no compulsion took place because the
petitioner was not supplying the grand jury with testimony, as this was not written
or oral communication ( United States v. Doe, 1981). The court further held that
since Doe had already admitted that foreign accounts exist, and the banks would
actually be supplying the documents, he was not o↵ering any evidence to the
court. The conservative ruling in this case gave the government the ability to
further gather evidence during grand jury proceedings.
The specific language of the Miranda warnings given to a suspect were the
court’s focus in its next Fifth Amendment case, Duckworth v. Eagan. The peti-
tioner, Gary Eagan was a suspect in a murder investigation and met with police
and signed a waiver with warnings that said counsel would be provided “if and
when” he went to court. The following day the respondent was questioned again,
signed a di↵erent waiver informing him of his rights, and then provided the police
with a confession and physical evidence of the murder. In a five to four decision
the court held that the warnings provided to the suspect were su cient, and that
as long as a they “reasonably conveyed the suspect’s constitutional rights” the ex-
act language from Miranda was not necessary (Duckworth v. Eagan, 1989). The
decision in Duckworth v. Eagan marked another conservative ruling, and gave
police more leeway in what constitutes su cient warnings.The Supreme Court
once again had to address police conduct and if it violated an individual’s Fifth
Amendment rights as guaranteed by the Constitution.
In one of the more high profile Miranda cases, Illinois v. Perkins, the court
had to decide if testimony gathered by undercover o cer’s violated a suspect’s
Fifth Amendment rights as outlined in Miranda. The respondent, Perkins, was an
inmate who confessed to committing a murder, absent any coercion or warnings,
to his cellmate who actually happened to be an undercover o cer. The court
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held that because there was no police dominated environment, nor any danger of
coercion Miranda does not apply. As Miranda was intended to protect individuals
in police custody, being questioned by police, where a compulsion to confess might
exist. The eight to one conservative ruling was another win for the government,
and expanded the scope of tactics that may be used against the criminally accused.
The court followed up this eight to one conservative ruling, with another eight
to one conservative ruling in Pennsylvania v. Muniz. In this case the court ruled
that incriminating utterances prior to Miranda warnings are admissible in trial
proceedings and do not constitute impermissible self-incrimination under the Fifth
Amendment. The statements used, according to the court, were physical in nature
as evidence, as they went to the driver’s mental state of intoxication rather than
used for content. The court also held that information freely given, and not elicited
by the o cer is also admissible in court. While the court narrowed the rights of the
accused in this case, in Minnick v. Mississippi, the next Fifth Amendment case
considered, the court expanded the rights of the criminally accused. The relevant
facts of this case are as follows; Minnick requested and met with his lawyer, police
then interrogated him and secured a confession without his lawyer present and
refused to sign a waiver of his rights during said interrogation, he then moved to
suppress the statements on the grounds his rights were violated when his lawyer
was not allowed to be present for police questioning.
In a six to two decision, the court agreed with the petitioner, relying on its
ruling in Edwards v. Arizona, that once the right to counsel was invoked no
interrogation could occur without counsel present unless the right was expressly
waived by the accused. The court further wrote that the right to an attorney is
not satisfied simply by meeting with the attorney outside of interrogation. On this
occasion the court expanded the rights of the criminally accused and ensured that
counsel would be present during interrogation if the suspect invokes the right. The
history of Miranda progeny cases once again brings us back to Arizona, where it
all started, and a popular theme for the court in the totality of the circumstances
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doctrine. In Arizona v. Fulminante the court had to decide if the petitioner’s
confession, which was obtained by a paid FBI informant who o↵ered Fulminante
protection in exchange for a confession, was admissible. The court also had to
decide if a second confession made to the informant’s wife was admissible or if it
was poisonous fruit of the first confession.
The court came down to a narrow five to four liberal ruling in this case, holding
that both confessions violated the respondent’s Fifth Amendment rights. The
first confession was given while trying to secure protection, making the confession
a result of coercion and therefore inadmissible, as the court held that “fear of
violence” caused Fulminante to confess (Arizona v. Fulminante 1990). Further,
the second confession was closely tied to the first and therefore also inadmissible;
both of these rulings were based on the totality of the circumstances, which the
court once again demonstrated was the correct way to evaluate such questions
- even if Arizona had done so erroneously. The court made another important
distinction in this case, that the confessions could not be dismissed as “harmless
error” as in this case they played a pivotal role in Fulminante’s conviction. Both
of these liberal rulings ensured rights for an individual on trial, that his coerced
statements will be dismissed and if admitted a conviction may not stand.
What happens if while a suspect is being questioned he makes an ambiguous
statement such as “maybe I should talk to a lawyer?” This was the next question
that the court had to answer in Davis v. United States, where a suspect after being
informed of his rights and knowingly waived them made an ambiguous request for
a lawyer. The o cer conducting the interrogation then stopped and clarified if the
petitioner would in fact like a lawyer and reminded Davis of his right to counsel,
to which the suspect declined and decided to continue answering questions. The
court held that there was violation of the Davis’ Fifth Amendment rights, and
Evans v. Arizona was properly applied. The unanimous decision by the court
was that questioning may continue after an ambiguous request for a lawyer was
made, and although it was proper for the investigator to clarify the suspect’s
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request it is not necessary. The court’s unanimous conservative ruling made it
necessary that the criminally accused assert their right to counsel in a direct and
unambiguous way if the request is to be honored and questioning is to cease.
Exceptions were continually being carved out for Miranda, with conservative
court rulings narrowing what was originally an expansive liberal ruling. With
the court considering Dickerson v. United States, the case directly challenged
Congress’ ability to overrule Miranda and whether or not Miranda was even con-
stitutional. The petitioner, Dickerson, gave a statement to the FBI before being
read his Miranda rights. The government contested that these statements should
not be suppressed under 18 USC Section 350 which states that voluntarily made
confessions are admissible evidence as long as they were made voluntarily. The
court ruled that with this law the government was attempting to create a volun-
tariness statute that would overrule the Miranda decision, and this was uncon-
stitutional. The decision in Miranda was a constitutional decision and therefore
cannot be overruled by Congress.
The seven to two decision also rea rmed Miranda as a constitutional decision,
although not with particularly strong language. The majority opinion, authored
by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, wrote that “Whether or not this Court would
agree with Miranda’s reasoning and its rule in the first instance, stare decisis
weighs heavily against overruling it now (Dickerson v. United States, 2000).” With
the opinion further stating that any overruling of Miranda, or any Constitutional
decision would require some “special justification” and the liberal answer to these
two questions made sure that the precedent set byMiranda would not be overruled
by Congress or by the United States Supreme Court itself.
The court returned to narrowing or expanding Miranda when it considered
the progeny case Yarborough v. Alvarado. The respondent who was seventeen at
the time was questioned, without being read any warnings, by police but at the
time was not placed under arrest. Statements obtained during this interview were
then used to convict Alvarado of second degree murder and attempted robbery.
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Although it is not disputed that Alvarado was under any sort of formal arrest
the court was forced to consider if age, as he was a minor, and experience with
the police must be considered when determining “in custody” for the purposed of
mirandizing an individual. The court disagreed with the respondent’s claim that
these other factors should be considered when determining, and instead wrote that
only objective criterion should be considered by police as this was the purpose of
Miranda in the first place. A subjective test would be too hard for police to apply
according to the court, and therefore in a five to four conservative decision the
criterion for applying and mirandizing a suspect stood.
After this close five to four decision, the court issued another five to four
decision in Hiibel v. Nevada. The petitioner, Hiibel, refused to provide police
investigating an assault with his name in violation of Nevada state law. The
failure to identify himself led to his arrest and conviction, Hiibel challenged the
conviction on the grounds that it violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination. The court disagreed, ruling that no Fifth Amendment violation
occurred because Hiibel never claimed that providing the police with his name
would incriminate him in any way. While the court respected the petitioner’s belief
that providing his name was unreasonable, the conservative ruling recognized the
state of Nevada’s necessity of such a law and absent a compulsion that incriminated
an individual, a state would require information to be provided.
In a four-justice plurality decision the court held that a post-Miranda confes-
sion is only admissible only if there was a significant break in the questioning to
give the suspect reasonable belief that he is not required to speak with the police.
The case Missouri v. Seibert involved a woman who was interrogated and gave
a purposely un-Mirandized confession, and was then immediately Mirandized and
repeated her confession to the o cer. In a concurring opinion that provided the
fifth vote, Justice Kennedy wrote that the evaluating the break is necessary only if
the police used the two-interrogation technique deliberately as they had with the
respondent. The liberal decision by the court protected the rights of the criminally
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accused from deceitful police tactics meant to coerce a confession.
With Miranda being put through many challenges and test, the court next
pondered if physical evidence that was found as a result of un-mirandized state-
ments should be admissible at trial. In United States v. Patane, the o cers in
the case were in the middle of mirandizing the respondent when he told them to
stop because he knew his rights, and then told the police that a gun was in his
house. Patane was an ex-felon and it was illegal for him to own a gun; with his
permission the police searched his house and found said weapon, which lead to his
prosecution. The government and Patane disagreed on whether or not the phys-
ical evidence, in this case the gun, that was found as a result of un-Mirandized
statements should be admitted. The court, in a plurality opinion, wrote that the
government is able to use such physical evidence even if the testimony is inadmissi-
ble because it violated the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights. The conservative
opinion marked another “win” for the government and allowed prosecution to use
evidence obtained from inadmissible statements as long as no physical force was
used.
3.4 The Roberts’ Court
After Patane the court experienced a few new faces joining the bench, with Chief
Justice Roberts joining the bench along with Justices Samuel Alito and Sonia So-
tomayor receiving their appointments before the next progeny case in Maryland
v. Shatzer. This case involves the respondent, Shatzer, who was initially ques-
tioned about sexually abusing his child and then invoked his Fifth Amendment
rights. Three years later a di↵erent detective re-read him his rights and questioned
Shatzer regarding the same accusations, waived his rights and confessed. This sec-
ond confession is where Shatzer claimed his Fifth Amendment rights per Edwards
v. Arizona as he was never a↵orded the opportunity to meet with counsel and
did not initiate additional conversation himself. The Supreme Court disagreed
and found that the substantial amount of time that had passed between the two
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interrogations and coinciding break in custody meant that Edwards did not apply.
This unanimous decision by Justice Scalia held that if an individual can return to
his normal life for fourteen days free from the pressure of interrogation Edwards
no longer holds.
The specific language of Miranda warnings once again came into question in
Florida v. Powell. The respondent claimed that his Fifth Amendment rights were
violated because the warnings he received state that he had the right to talk to an
attorney but the warnings did not explicitly state that one could be present during
interrogation. The Supreme Court disagreed with earlier court’s rulings on this
matter and held that Miranda only requires that a suspect’s rights are reasonably
conveyed to him, which the court found that the o cer’s in this case did. The
majority further held that no specific words are required and this reasonableness
is the only test needed. The seven to two vote was another conservative ruling in
the Miranda progeny cases, and allowed police more flexibility when informing an
individual of their rights.
The court’s next case, Berghuis v. Thompkins, involved a suspect who claimed
his Miranda rights were violated when he refused to sign a waiver of those rights,
or make eye contact with police, even though he spoke with police and never asked
for a lawyer. Although a court of appeals agreed with the suspect, Thompkins,
the Supreme Court found that they had improperly expanded the Miranda rule.
In a five to four decision Justice Kennedy wrote that Thompkins failed to invoke
his right to counsel or to remain silent because he failed to unambiguously, and
further reasoned that he waived said rights when he “knowingly and voluntarily”
spoke with police. The court’s next case allowed them to revisit Fare v. Michael,
and how Miranda applies to juvenile suspects.
The case, J.D.B. v. North Carolina featured a thirteen year old boy who was
questioned by police at school, in front of school o cials but without his parents,
and without being read any rights. During the interrogation petitioner, J.D.B.
confessed to a string of burglaries both later moved to suppress his confession on
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the grounds of a Fifth Amendment violation. The Supreme Court then considered
whether or not a juvenile suspect’s age should influence the reading of Miranda
rights, as the boy was under arrest, but was still being interrogated at the time.
In a five to four liberal decision the court held that a child’s age needs to be
considered when determining custody for the purposes of Miranda as the child’s
age plays an important factor. The decision lead to an end of the bright line
rule for establishing custody, at least according to the dissent authored by Justice
Alito.
The court, following J.D.B. v. North Carolina, decided Howes v. Fields. In
this case a suspect already in jail on unrelated charges was questioned regarding
sexual abuse of a thirteen-year-old and was subsequently convicted on related
charges. At the time of questioning the respondent was not mirandized, although
he was advised that he could end the interrogation at any time and return to his
cell. The lower courts agreed with Fields, and found that his Fifth Amendment
rights were violated. Upon review by the United States Supreme Court however,
the lower court ruling was reversed. The majority opinion, authored by Justice
Alito, in which he wrote that imprisonment and questioning about outside events
do not automatically create a custodial situation per Miranda. The fact that
Fields could return to his cell at any time and was informed of this right was the
key to this conservative ruling, and why the court determined that no violation of
his rights occurred.
The final case coded in this analysis was Salinas v. Texas which was decided
in 2013. The petitioner in this case was accused of a double homicide and was
questioned regarding the incident, but was not under arrest at the time and there-
fore no Miranda rights were read nor required. The court had to determine if
these statements were admissible in court and, therefore, if the Fifth Amendment
Self-Incrimination Clause allows non-mirandized silence to be introduced as evi-
dence. The court concluded that Fifth Amendment protections do not extend to
defendants who decide to remain silent and an individual must explicitly invoke
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his Fifth Amendment rights. The court did carve out two exceptions to the ex-
plicit claim, a defendant does not need to take the stand to claim privilege and
failure to claim Fifth Amendment protection does not apply if the government
coerced statements. This final decision put the burden to enact an individual’s
Fifth Amendment right on the individual rather than a burden on the government
to respect such a privilege. This conservative decision marks the end of the cases
examined in for my purposes with this chapter serving as a history of the cases
and their respective decisions.
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4 Methods
I am novice with advanced statistical methods, and here quote correspondence
with my adviser as introduction to the method of extracting the ideological content
from my data. “The ideal point model estimated is due originally to Bafumi,
Gelman, and Park (2005) and explained further in Gelman and Hill (2007). It has
the basic form:
Pr(yij = 1) = logit 1(↵i(✓j    i))
Equation (1) is an adaptation of Gelman and Hill’s Equation (14.13, p. 316).
Here, Pr(yij = 1) is the probability of a conservative vote on a case (indexed by
i) by an individual justice (indexed by j). It is presumed that these probabilities
follow the logistic function and depend on three parameters: two at the level of
the case (alpha and beta) and one at the level of the justice (theta). One of the
case-level variables – beta – is trivial in that it is determined by the number of
conservative (scored 1) votes on a case. The other case-level variable – alpha –
is unique in that it represents a case weight where high values indicate higher
importance or discrimination for justice ideology in determining the votes.” No
previous study in judicial politics has examined the relationship between cases and
justice-level ideology inside a single doctrine. Additionally, many studies exclude
unanimous decisions, however I use a complete dataset on all decisions made by
the court.
The ideology variable (theta) is also a first, as no previous study has even at-
tempted a sophisticated estimation strategy for judicial ideology against a funda-
mental precedent as doctrine inside an area of the law develops over time. Caldeira,
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Wright, and Zorn (1999) crudely estimate judicial ideology inside so-called “issue-
areas” using codes from the Supreme Court Database that categorize cases in very
broad areas of public law. They use the proportion of cases inside an issue area
where a justice votes for the more conservative party in the case to distinguish
the justices ideologically in that area. These measures are not determined against
a precedent in a single doctrinal area of the court’s jurisprudence. They are less-
aggregated than most ideology measures, but not focused as is the case here on
one doctrine.
In the following section(s), I examine the case-level (importance) variable and
the justice-level (ideology) variable estimated from my data as well as compare
and contrast these to previous measures, especially what happens when a justices
overall ideological score is compared to a their doctrinal score. I also enter into a
brief discussion into the median justice on the doctrinal issue, Miranda, and how
this compares to the natural court.
5 Results
Below significant results and findings of this study are discussed.
5.1 Theta Variable and Discussion
As just mentioned the theta term is the score developed for each justice inside the
doctrine of Miranda, and this is the first time such an ideological score has been
developed for a single doctrine issue area. An examination of the ideological scores
in a vacuum reveal how justices behave - how liberal or how conservative they are
within Miranda. Additionally, these quantitative results lead to some important
distinctions in judicial behavior in regards to Miranda my work, when comparing
the measures to the ideological scores developed by Rice et. al or Sega and Cover,
which are broad measures of ideology across issue areas. To compare I looked at
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the residuals between both of these measures as well regress the two other scores
against my own. Below are some of the qualitative insights into the court that I
gleaned from examining and comparing the scores.
An important note before these discussions begin however is the di↵erences
in scale of my data and the Rice, et al. scores as well as the Segal-Cover scores.
Unlike my ideology scores, the Rice, et al. data scores liberal justices as greater
than zero, and conservative justices as less than zero so the more negative a justice
is the more conservative he is, where mine a more conservative justice would be
highly positive. Both the scores presented here and the Rice, et al. scores are
unconstrained, however the Segal-Cover scores are scored between one and zero,
with one being the most liberal and zero the most conservative. Additionally due
to the constrained nature of the Segal-Cover scores justice’s share the distinction
of the most conservative or most liberal on the court, with multiple scoring a one
or zero.
5.1.1 The Liberal and the Conservative
The theta scores are presented in the table (Table 1) below from the most liberal
to the most conservative. The justice’s are labeled by their U.S. Supreme Court
Database codes in order to easily compare them to other measures. Along with
Table 1, I include Figure 1 which plots the theta residuals.
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Figure 1—Theta Scores of Supreme Court Justice’s
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Table 1: Theta Scores
Theta
WODouglas -5.129119159
TMarshall -3.107424038
WJBrennan -2.398281488
SGBreyer -1.585503503
HLBlack -1.512690742
JPStevens -1.423182349
Ewarren -1.117394077
RBGinsburg -1.107479563
AFortas -1.057941043
SSotomayor -0.905021719
DHSouter -0.659351171
EKagan -0.177772433
HABlackmun 0.400012653
TCCLark 0.661486748
JHarlan2 0.894274512
AMKennedy 1.018819237
Pstewart 1.031707152
BRWhite 1.351073852
JGRoberts 1.388391511
SAAlito 1.38962062
WEBurger 1.448032319
LFPowell 1.456295726
SDOConnor 1.901565877
CThomas 2.157318586
AScalia 2.187111297
WHRehnquist 3.730573487
An important validity marker to my score was that Justice Douglas scored as
the most liberal justice on the court at (theta = -5.129). This finding o↵ers an
important measure of face validity because Douglas is consistently the most liberal
justice in other Bayesian models of the Supreme Court. In the measure’s across
ideological scores by Rice, et. al as well as the dynamic ideal point estimation
by Martin and Quinn Douglas was also found to be significantly more liberal
than other justice’s, which coincides with the findings in my model. While the
Segal-Cover scores do not have Douglas as the most liberal justice, these scores
are developed by editorials written prior to nomination and do not reflect actual
voting outcomes on the Supreme Court. So while Justice Douglas may not have
been the most liberal justice prior to his nomination it would seem that once
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nominated, he has been consistently found to be the leftist leaning justice.
The most conservative justice within the Miranda doctrine is William Rehn-
quist, which is qualitatively supported as he spent much of his time on the bench
fighting Miranda, stopping short of repealing it only in order to respect stare de-
cisis. While the other measures of judicial ideology do not rank Rehnquist as the
most conservative, they also do not produce consistent results as to who the fur-
thest right justice is. The Rice et. al, scores have Clarence Thomas as well as the
Martin-Quinn scores, although at times their most conservative justice changes as
their measure moves across time. In the Rice et al, Rehnquist was the second most
conservative justice, while in Martin-Quinn he was at times the most conservative
but has the 2nd-most conservative median and mean. The Segal-Cover scores on
the other hand have Scalia as the most conservative justice, followed once again
by Rehnquist, while Thomas is the fourth most right-leaning justice.
All of this to say that my ranking of Rehnquist does not invalidate the theta
measure especially given the lack of consensus on who is the furthest right to
serve. The measures of conservative ideology are much more tightly clustered than
compared to how much more liberal Douglas is than any other justice, making it
completely plausible for Rehnquist to be the most conservative on a single issue
area. Rehnquist is followed by Scalia and Thomas as the next two furthest right.
These three always ranked as some of the most conservative justices on the court,
once again adding validity to my measure despite the relatively small data size.
5.1.2 Comparing ✓ and Rice through Residuals
Along with comparing the absolute rankings of justices to other scores, the di↵er-
ence between the scores, for a single justice reveal a lot about their overall behavior
compared to how their preferences when faced with a Miranda case. Specifically
I exam the di↵erence (residual) for a given justice between the scores developed
here within the doctrine, and the scores developed by Rice, et al which are scored
across multiple issue areas. These residuals can indicate how di↵erent or similar a
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justice’s overall ideology compared to how they behave when faced with a question
about Miranda. Once again, these quantitative observations allow a qualitative
discussion on judicial behavior.
Also included is figure two which plots the Rice, et al. scores against the Bayes
scored developed as a result of this research. The pertinent justice’s discussed are
highlighted and label, as well as providing a regression of the two scores, to see
how they coincide on almost a one to one ratio. Along with figure two, table two
is presented which shows justice’s theta scores, Rice et. al, residual between the
two, and their Segal-Cover scores.
The largest residual between the ideological scores presented here and the
Rice et. al score belongs to Thomas, as well as Scalia having another notably
large residual. These two justice’s are consistently considered two of the most
conservative justices, both qualitatively and quantitatively, on the court. These
residuals should be large however, given the doctrinal history of Miranda and
a consistent pattern that emerges of conservatives staunchly opposing Miranda
after the initial decision. The case created a sweeping and broad liberal doctrine
that over time right-leaning justice’s have whittled away at to create a much more
narrow, much more conservative interpretation of the Fifth Amendment. So, the
large residuals for uber-conservative justice’s such as Thomas and Scalia reflect
that they are much similar to other conservatives on the issue of Miranda compared
to most issues where they fall much further right than the average conservative.
Di↵erences in the Rice, et al. scores compared to the Miranda ideology scores
for a number of liberal justices also reveal a great deal about their behavior when
presented with questions relating to the doctrine. Notably, Justice Breyer has a
large residual in the negative direction (-2.636) indicating that he is much more
liberal when it comes to Miranda compared to a case in any given issue area. In
fact, Rice, et al. assigned him a score of 0.6, meaning that across issue areas he is
almost perfectly moderate, only leaning slightly liberal. However, when it comes
to Miranda, Breyer moves further left compared to his usual ideology when faced
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with case questions regardingMiranda than any other justice, with no other liberal
justice moving further left than one standard deviation. This would indicate that
Justice Breyer is the liberal stalwart on the court, and is supported by the fact
that Breyer voted liberally on every Miranda progeny he presided over with the
exception of the unanimous conservative decision in Maryland v. Shatzer.
While Breyer moves significantly more liberal in light of Miranda, other tra-
ditionally liberal justices move much further right, notably Chief Justice Warren
(who authored Miranda) and Justice Black who also voted with the majority in
Miranda v. Arizona. Compared to their respective scores on other issue areas,
these two justice’s are significantly more conservative with Chief Justice Warren
having a residual of 2.655 and Justice Black with a residual of 2.366. In the Rice
et. al scores Black is the third most liberal justice, while Warren is the fourth
most liberal, compared to the Miranda ideology scores where Warren is not even
in the top five. Additionally the preferences of Warren and Black are much closer
to the preferences of other liberal justice’s where across issue areas they are much
further left than the typical liberal justice.
The timing of when Warren and Black were on the court may have played
an important factor in how their preferences are expressed. Both of these jus-
tice’s were part of a majority that passed sweeping liberal legislation on the Fifth
Amendment, however this broad interpretation left many undefined terms and
open ended questions. Immediately following Miranda it was up to the court to
bring clarity to the doctrine, define these terms such as ‘custody’ or ‘interrogation’
and answer the questions brought before the court by petitioners. It is completely
possible that the criminally accused were attempting an overly broad reading of
what was meant in Warren’s opinion for Miranda and therefore he and Black had
to answer questions conservatively. Additionally both of these justice’s only sat on
the court for a short-time after Miranda, with neither hearing more than twelve
cases.
The comparisons above to Rice, et al’s cross-issue score’s and an examina-
62
tion of the residuals allows us to glean insights into how behavior within Miranda
di↵ers from a justice’s typical behavior. Whether the justice’s behave how they
typically do, with residuals that approach zero such as is the case with Burger or
Marshall, or if large residuals exist and atypical behavior persists, these quantita-
tive observations and subsequent qualitative analysis continue to shed light on to
judicial ideology and behavior.
Figure 2—Rice-Bayes Regression Plot
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Table 2: Table 2: Score Comparisions
Theta Rice et al Residual Seagal-Cover Score
HLBlack -1.512690742 5 2.366303932 0.875
WODouglas -5.129119159 6.49 -1.791189348 0.73
TCCLark 0.661486748 1.175 1.970981163 0.5
Ewarren -1.117394077 4.68 2.655376477 0.75
JHarlan2 0.894274512 -1.98 -0.862963539 0.875
WJBrennan -2.398281488 4.63 0.630822747 1
Pstewart 1.031707152 0.46 1.813295371 0.75
BRWhite 1.351073852 0.53 2.395581519 0.5
AFortas -1.057941043 4.12 2.206566425 1
TMarshall -3.107424038 5.25 0.146719853 1
WEBurger 1.448032319 -1.89 0.124741462 0.115
HABlackmun 0.400012653 1.13 1.515402054 0.115
LFPowell 1.456295726 -0.78 1.271334854 0.165
WHRehnquist 3.730573487 -4.26 1.347637625 0.045
JPStevens -1.423182349 2.19 -0.278704053 0.25
SDOConnor 1.901565877 -2.17 0.579080235 0.415
AScalia 2.187111297 -5 -1.808862086 0
AMKennedy 1.018819237 -2.62 -1.239300664 0.365
DHSouter -0.659351171 0.378 -0.836726057 0.325
CThomas 2.157318586 -6.53 -3.350702896 0.16
RBGinsburg -1.107479563 1.15 -0.833604615 0.68
SGBreyer -1.585503503 0.06 -2.636205368 0.475
JGRoberts 1.388391511 -3.85 -1.897904508 0.12
SAAlito 1.38962062 -4.7 -2.747428248 0.1
SSotomayor -0.905021719 1.2 -0.454917619 0.78
EKagan -0.177772433 0.19 -0.285334717 0.73
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5.2 A Discussion on the Alpha Term
The case-level (importance) variable allowed me to identify how influential a given
case was on the overall ideological scores given to the justices. Presented in the
table below are the fifteen most and least important cases in determining judicial
ideology from the Miranda doctrine (figure 1). An important question to ask is
what features makes some cases important (or unimportant). Intuitively, there are
many potential answers to this question such as a case that is decided five to four
rather than nine to zero would be more influential. However, this is not always
necessarily as five to four votes do not always split the justices in order of ideology.
Some of these important and unimportant ideologically cases are now discussed
below with insights into why this might be. The proceeding tables (Table 3 and
Table 4) displays the fifteen lowest alpha scores from lowest to highest and the
fifteen highest alpha scores from lowest to highest.
The most important case in determining judicial ideology from the Miranda
doctrine was Mary Berghuis, Warden v. Thompkins. This is a relatively modern
case in the doctrine’s history as it was heard by the Robert’s court in 2010. The
case-question revolved around if the doctrine was improperly expanded by the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals when it ruled that Thompkins Fifth Amendment
rights had been violated because he had been questioned after he had been in-
formed of his rights but refused to sign an acknowledgement that he was informed
of said rights. The opinion in this five to four decision does fall along ideological
lines with the five most conservative (least liberal) justices siding against the four
least conservative (most liberal) justices on the court at the time. This proper and
perfect ordering of justices created an environment that allowed such a high alpha
(alpha = 4.487). The case, Berghuis v. Thompkins is not considered a landmark
case in Miranda’s doctrinal history. In fact the ruling, and subsequent opinion
authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, in this case added almost nothing original
to Miranda. The case, more than anything, reiterated previous positions taken
by the court. specifically the ruling in Davis, that the invocation of rights must
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be unambiguous. This opinion by Kennedy, while substantively unremarkable, is
interesting nonetheless because Kennedy is the median voter on the natural court
as well as the median justice of the Miranda doctrine on the court at this time.
The median justice is addressed at length later in this section, as theta scores in
the doctrine are compared to other measures developed across all doctrines.
Although the highest weighted (most important) case on the ideological score
was not important in Miranda’s doctrinal history, one case that has a large influ-
ence on the ideological score as well as plays an important role in the doctrine is
Rhode Island v. Innis. The votes on this case were six to three also split along
ideological with the three most liberal justices constituting a the minority, and
the six most conservative justices voting together. In the opinion authored by
Potter Stewart the court defined what constituted interrogation for the purposes
of the Miranda rule and was written into law in this decision. The court severely
narrowed Miranda in this case, writing that express questioning was required to
trigger the Miranda warnings and constitute an interrogation.
The weight given at alpha = 4.060 to this case is especially interesting because
of the important position that this case occupies by defining interrogation. When
theMiranda ruling came out it was very broad and undefined, and over time it has
been narrowed and continually clarified. Rhode Island v. Innis is one of the cases
that both narrowed and gave definition to uncertain terms, like interrogation, that
is found in the Miranda doctrine. In fact this case is so important to criminal law
that it occupies its own section in Understanding Criminal Procedure by Joshua
Dressler. None of this is coded into my dataset, the only input is a logit model of
zero’s and one’s that reflect judicial votes. The case, Rhode Island v. Innis, is not
only functionally and historically important to the Miranda rules but also given
a great deal of weight in determining theta values in my model. Although this
is not necessarily a way to validate my model, as votes are used to discriminate
between judicial ideologies rather than anything to do with establishing a strong
legal doctrine, it is interesting to say the least that cases influencing Miranda
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also had a heavy influence on judicial ideologies within the doctrine. Standing in
contrast with the most highly weighted progeny case as well as Rhode Island v.
Innis, the least important case in determining doctrinal ideology was Dunaway v.
New York.
This case was a six to two ideological decision with a liberal outcome; Justice
Powell did not participate in the discussion or decision of the case. Dunaway was
predominately a Fourth Amendment case, however the question arose that follow-
ing an illegal arrest is testimony admissible given that the suspect was properly
mirandized. Predicting solely o↵ whether a justice’s theta score as either liberal or
conservative on Miranda, we would have expected a five to three decision in favor
of New York, that is a conservative ruling. While interesting that such an unim-
portant case in the history of Miranda, where the Fifth Amendment takes a back
seat to other issues facing the court, is interesting to be weighted so lowly. More
importantly the alpha measure stands up as this case misrepresented the justice’s
typical preferences, essentially mis-ordering their votes and therefore caused the
low alpha score of (alpha=0.368).
This misordering of justice’s average preferences on Miranda cases to votes in
on actual cases continue to appear. Sims v. Georgia, the third Miranda progeny
case heard following the decision in 1965, featured an eight to one liberal vote
on a case that involved judicial procedure as it related to Miranda. The majority
opinion on the case held that must make a preliminary finding on whether or not an
admission of guilt was voluntary, even if he does not make a formal ruling or author
an opinion on the matter. This eight to one decision was split so that the most
liberal and conservative justices all voted together, and the lone conservative vote
was Justice Black. This is quite remarkable because he is the third most liberal
justice on the court with a theta score of 2.366. This misordering of judicial
preferences is once again why the the alpha term is so low and the model deemed
the case as unimportant to overall ideological scores on the Miranda doctrine.
This finding by the model appears to be correct as Justice Black’s dissent is in
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reference to one feature of the majority opinion, which was the holding used in the
Fifth Amendment case Jackson v. Denno. This once again shows that the alpha
term is working and weighting cases correctly, as it weighed a case whose votes
had less to do with Miranda and more to do with another constitutional issue
extremely low at (alpha=0.482). While the case itself certainly has to do with
judicial procedure in light of Miranda what is actually happening is the justice’s
are voting their attitudes on another case, with separate doctrinal issues in Jackson
v. Denno. Furthermore, the appearance of judicial procedure and conduct rather
than a pure Bill of Rights issue changes the preference of the court. Given all of
this, Sims v. Georgia should not heavily influence and does not heavily influence
the overall scores, which again brings validity to my measure and coding.
To juxtaposeWarden v. Thompkins with another influential case United States
v. Doe (1984) in which two questions were asked of the court. However only the
unanimous 9-0 liberal decision to the question of whether or not a grant of immu-
nity was required when the individual was compelled to produce the subpoenaed
business records related to the Fifth Amendment. The court ruled that in order
to compel the production of these records a grant of immunity must be issued, a
clear decision in favor of the criminally accused despite some of the court’s most
conservative justices presiding over the case. This would indicate that even the
petitioner’s position, this case the United States, was either wrong in their inter-
pretation of the Fifth Amendment or so far right that even the most conservative
justice in Rhenquist sided with the liberals on the court, as he signed on to an
opinion that Justice Powell authored.
The final case I would like to highlight is again from the Burger Court in
New Jersey v. Portash. This case was again one of the least important cases
in which the court ruled that compulsory self-incrimination before a grand jury
and under a grant of immunity could not later be used against him in a criminal
trial, with the exception of perjury. This seven to two liberal decision without
a doubt protected the criminally accused, and as the majority opinion concluded
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was necessary in preventing perjury. What is remarkable though is that Rehn-
quist, the most conservative justice on the court, signed on to the liberal majority
opinion, which happened in less than 15% of the non-unanimous cases (n=56) he
heard on Miranda. This alone should make it an unimportant as it almost repre-
sents an aberration from his usual doctrine than anything resembling his ideology.
Furthermore the two justices that voted together, Burger and Blackmun, are the
third-most and sixth-most conservative justices respectively. While the measure
predicts that since Rehnquist sided with the liberal decision the other outcome
was much too far conservative to be considered. Once again the misordering of
judicial votes, as they move away from their typical preferences on the issue area
they become unimportant in the model.
The cases highlighted show the strengths of my alpha term in the equation,
with qualitatively important cases being deemed important, while unimportant
cases are properly weighed as well. More importantly, this discussion reveals that
the alpha term is working properly because the cases it discounted are the one’s
that are misrepresentative of a justice’s ideology overall as it relates to this single
doctrine issue area, and therefore should be weighed less heavily than cases that
perfectly match judicial preferences.
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Table 3: Table 3: Lowest ↵ Scores
Alpha Weight Case ID
32 0.367813803297282 99 S. Ct. 2248
26 0.441388277352714 96 S. Ct. 2240
29 0.44905408367104 97 S. Ct. 2132
3 0.482126727397403 87 S. Ct. 639
30 0.487066521112391 99 S. Ct. 1292
58 0.519560045620678 108 S. Ct. 2284
65 0.594334488091797 111 S. Ct. 1246 1
64 0.601366380633413 111 S. Ct. 1246
59 0.71432112558172 108 S. Ct. 2341
6 0.78552677407967 88 S. Ct. 2008
67 0.962830564836344 120 S. Ct. 2180
2 0.973874616625478 86 S. Ct. 1826
7 0.974287167541955 88 S. Ct. 1978
68 0.979003605484131 120 S. Ct. 2180 1
57 1.00414555056181 107 S. Ct. 3102
Table 4: Table 4: Highest ↵ Scores
Alpha Weight Case ID
31 3.90968804707028 99 S. Ct. 1755
43 3.91047852173004 104 S. Ct. 1237 1
50 3.95813970160751 106 S. Ct. 1135
12 3.95831140135689 91 S. Ct. 643
49 3.9887559417398 105 S. Ct. 1285
45 3.99279845412349 104 S. Ct. 2626
13 3.99598757150552 91 S. Ct. 1535
34 4.0152925279714 100 S. Ct. 874
44 4.03099883352539 104 S. Ct. 1136
37 4.0597260672265 100 S. Ct. 1682
78 4.18807167577098 133 S. Ct. 2174
69 4.20051268039954 124 S. Ct. 2140
70 4.22955262096949 124 S. Ct. 2451
72 4.24628411424519 124 S. Ct. 2620
75 4.48740692177983 130 S. Ct. 2250
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6 Median Justice
A final feature of the data that is worth discussing in this analysis is the median
justice on a natural court. The median justice builds o↵ of the median voter
theorem where the court’s expressed policy preference will be that of the justice’s
views who are ideologically centered compared to the rest of the court. While past
studies on this have examined who the median voter is across issues, the analysis
within Miranda allows the median justice to be identified for this single issue.
When contrasting these two results there are some interesting di↵erences that are
worth discussion.
The accepted median justice on the court for the 1980’s (following the appoint
of O’Connor) is Justice White, who served from 1962 until 1993. This is sup-
ported by his middling score of 0.5 in the Segal-Cover Scores, as well as Justice
White being the median justice when arranged by the scores from Rice, et. al.
Furthermore, Martin-Quinn’s analysis supports these findings. Along with White
as the median voter across issues, in this analysis he falls as the median voter
from the appointment of O’Connor in 1981 until the appointment of Kennedy in
1988. After the appointment of Justice Kennedy, the median justice for Miranda
issues moves from White to Kennedy, although White remains the median voter
across issues in the alternative analyses mentioned before until the appointment
of Justice Souter.
Following the appointment of Justice Souter in 1990, Kennedy becomes the
swing vote on Miranda cases, while Souter is the swing vote overall; these median
justice’s only last a year however as the appointment of Thomas returns the median
vote to Kennedy within the doctrine as well as the median voter overall. After
the retirement of White, and the subsequent appoint of Justice Ginsburg, the
median voter is commonly accepted as O’Connor. While this may be true across
all doctrine’s, once again the median voter onMiranda is Kennedy, and he remains
so throughout the rest of the court’s iterations. Kennedy as the median justice
on the Miranda issues foreshadows the position he occupied as the median justice
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since the retirement of Justice O’Connor. Also of importance is that can be gleaned
from this data is that one voter most likely does not exist across all issue areas,
and the swing vote will di↵er depending on what is being asked of the court.
7 Conclusion
The study of judicial behavior has been a constant question, and one with the goal
of understanding how and why the Supreme Court comes to make decisions. A
plethora of research has attempted to answer these questions through the attitu-
dinal model and measurements of ideology. Studies by Segal and Cover centered
ideology independent of judicial votes, using editorials prior to confirmation to
determine a justice’s ideology. More recent studies like those by Martin-Quinn,
and Rice, et al. examine judicial votes while on the bench to determine a justice’s
ideological preferences - a much more direct measure of how the justice’s behave
on the bench while looking across issues they actually address. While all of these
measures have a good degree of validity, the work here is unique in its own right
as it examines ideology at the question level within a single-doctrine.
The work here is the first of its kind, with none other being focused on how
justice’s have answered questions regarding a doctrine and from those votes de-
velop a single-issue ideology using ideal-point estimation. While this work does
not develop comprehensive scores for the justice’s the strength of these prefer-
ences is revealed in how small a sample size was needed to produce extremely
valid results. The sample size used here is smaller than typical for an ideal point
estimation with some justice’s only having a handful of votes however, the model
correctly orders the justice’s and matches the results quantitatively of cross-issue
studies, and qualitatively of what we see occurring on the court at the time re-
garding Miranda and the Supreme Court at the time.
The scores here and methods used also allow for a great deal of further re-
search. The data and models developed here are far from flushed out as plenty
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of patterns are left to explore and the votes can be manipulated to reveal much
more about the Court and how it treats Miranda. One application is how the
justice’s joining the court move from liberal or conservative over time. With these
nominations and confirmations reflecting the presidential politics at the time, as a
liberal justice is added by a liberal president, the political preferences are mirrored
in the Supreme Court. Additionally, if the justice and the president are opposed
on an issue it could reveal that an issue is not important to the nominating pres-
ident. Another, more obvious application is applying the methods here to other
single doctrine issue areas. The replication or lack there of would have validity to
the methods used here, and reveal preferences in other issue areas such as Roe v.
Wade. Ultimately, the possibilities are nearly infinite of what to do with the data
developed from this study, as well as applying these methods to other issue areas
and scoring the judicial votes at the question-level.
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